As Lebanon commemorates the fifty-first anniversary of the start of its destructive civil war of 1975-1990, its presidency and government have embarked on direct negotiations with Israel, a development that is feared to potentially lead to the renewal of that detested civil strife.
Lebanese and Israeli delegations met in Washington on 14 April for direct talks on a ceasefire.
Hezbollah and the Amal Movement—the two organisations representing Lebanon’s Shia community—declared their strong opposition. And, a few days prior to the delegations meeting, protesters against the decision gathered around the Grand Serai—the prime minister’s headquarters—prompting a heavy deployment of troops by the Lebanese Army to ensure stability and civic peace.
Lebanon’s potential recognition of Israel as a result of negotiations in Washington has resurrected the polarisation extant on the eve of 13 April 1975, the start of the old civil war, notwithstanding the different circumstances, triggers, and participants. But it is hard to believe that anyone who beholds the horrors and destruction of the civil war would contemplate allowing the current strong disagreement to get out of hand.
The fifteen-year war killed some 100,000 people, injured another 100,000, destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, and displaced a million people around the country, principally on sectarian grounds.
Still, both the logic and the emotions surrounding the idea of negotiations with Israel at present conjure heated, and not entirely unreasonable, opposition. Israel continues its daily attacks on purported Hezbollah positions around Lebanon, which have killed more than 2,000 people and injured 6,500 others. Israeli attacks have also displaced more than one million people from southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
Attacks have also destroyed and rendered uninhabitable entire villages in the south along the border. Israel has also used white phosphorus munitions against southern villages and sprayed them with concentrated herbicide in order to kill forests and vegetation and discourage inhabitants from returning, in what essentially is a well-coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Since Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s call for talks between Lebanon and Israel last March, the Lebanese government has held onto the idea of a ceasefire with Israel before negotiations begin, but it now appears that it has accepted going to Washington without that condition being met. Neither has Israel thus far expressed any interest in meeting Lebanon’s demands in negotiations: withdrawal from occupied territories, release of Lebanese prisoners, and an end to attacks.
After approving negotiations with Lebanon on 10 April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that whatever deal was reached would include completely dismantling Hezbollah as the primary goal. In other words, if Lebanon is to have the peace it wants, it must accept Israeli conditions before Israel agrees to any concessions on territory, prisoners, or the end of hostilities.
Israeli officials are also on record declaring that they will not allow any return of the displaced to southern villages. Defence Minister Israel Katz minced no words at the end of March when he invoked the Gaza model and declared that his forces will destroy all homes along the border and prevent their inhabitants—in the hundreds of thousands—from returning.
The Israeli air force has destroyed several bridges connecting southern Lebanon to the rest of the country, purportedly to cut off Hezbollah supply lines, but in reality to dominate the region. Even as the Lebanese and Israeli delegations were preparing to meet in Washington, Israel was trying to occupy Bint Jbeil, a city on the border of southern Lebanon and Israel.
To those Lebanese who oppose negotiations with Israel, this situation renders the idea of talks partly dystopian and partly naïve. Indeed, the Lebanese government’s belief that it can negotiate with Israel as an equal partner is very likely unrealistic, given the obvious imbalance of power and the Trump administration’s blatant bias in favour of Israel.
Finally, a recent poll found that a majority of Israelis disapprove of a ceasefire with either Iran or Lebanon.
On the other hand, those supporting the call for negotiations with Israel see their track as the only viable alternative to conditions on the ground. They argue that those opposed are responsible for the current crisis, blaming Hezbollah’s firing of rockets on Israel on 2 March for the latter’s devastating attacks and expulsion of south Lebanon’s inhabitants.
Essentially, what animates this group of Lebanese is the overall idea of Hezbollah’s independence from the state and its acting as if it is an adjunct of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
There is much truth to this argument of blaming Hezbollah for the ongoing conflict as part of a joint front with Iran.
For some 15 months until the end of February 2026, the party refrained from responding to Israel’s over 15,000 attacks against its positions in Lebanon, which were in violation of a ceasefire signed in November 2024. But when Israel and the United States assassinated Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the party responded by firing six rockets on northern Israel, practically giving Israel justification for its current campaign. The Lebanese government has fully distanced itself from Hezbollah’s actions and confrontation with Israel and has tried to curb its activities. Following the party’s attack on Israel in March, Premier Salam announced a ban on Hezbollah’s military operations and called for a cessation of hostilities with Israel.
The government and its supporters also blame Iran for interfering in Lebanese affairs by aiding Hezbollah and speaking on Lebanon’s behalf, as it did when it linked its negotiations with the United States regarding reaching a ceasefire in Lebanon. They also question why it is acceptable for Tehran to negotiate with Washington—and through it with Israel—while Lebanon cannot try to find an accommodation with Israel through negotiations.
It is these diametrically opposed positions that overshadow the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington. As of now, it is hard to gauge how successful the talks will be in bridging the deep chasm between the wishes and demands of the Lebanese and the Israelis.
But from observing Israel’s genocidal behaviour on the ground and in the skies of Lebanon, it seems that Beirut’s negotiating team will be very hard-pressed to achieve much of a diplomatic breakthrough. Imad K. Harb is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC. Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.