The most likely outcome remains the failure of the amphibious operation and the waste of American lives. Join us on Telegram , Twitter , and VK . Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su Given the current course of Middle Eastern events, we have no idea whether the U.S. will simply abandon the conflict with Iran to focus on other objectives in light of the failure of its plans against Tehran, or whether it will simply double down and attempt to land troops there.
This war cannot be analyzed from the perspective of economic interest or necessary and realistic geopolitical objectives on the part of the U.S., as its decisions are often irrational and, therefore, difficult to predict.
Let us suppose, therefore, that the U.S. is indeed planning to double down and launch a ground invasion of Iran.
First of all, why would they do this? Because the only way to militarily defeat a regional or world power is through the use of ground forces. It is possible to bomb a micronation into submission, but not a power, even if only regional.
Decapitation strikes don’t work either. Embargoes and naval blockades even less so. Only the action of ground forces, that is, armies in the classical sense of the term, can undertake territorial occupation, depose a government, and inflict a strategic and definitive defeat on an enemy that is not a micronation.
The motivation would therefore be to impose a clear and unavoidable defeat on Iran, placing it in checkmate or, at the very least, in check. In other words, we could be talking about either an operation aimed at regime change via ground forces (checkmate) or the occupation of one or more strategic points to force negotiations on terms favorable to the U.S., without seeking the enemy’s ultimate destruction (check).
Practically speaking, the only possibility discussed is a landing on Kharg Island, but there are several other target hypotheses. For example, the capture of Qeshm and the other islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Or the capture of Bandar Abbas itself, which faces the Strait. Others speculate about a more ambitious operation at the port of Chabahar in Iranian Balochistan.
Now, well, anything is possible, including a successful amphibious operation (that is, landing troops in hostile territory) that achieves its objectives. But historical precedents are not very favorable to the U.S.’s potential aspirations.
Except under some very special conditions, there is no history of amphibious operations that have constituted victories.
Those who would appeal to the famous Normandy landings, Operation Overlord, in which a vanguard of 160,000 men crossed the English Channel to begin an invasion of “Germanized” Europe, would quickly appear. However, this is a very specific case.
The Germans in the northern French theater were vastly outnumbered by the Allied troops – one and a half months after the landings, there were 300,000 Germans against 1.5 million Allies. Furthermore, 80% of Germany’s men and military resources were being used on the Eastern Front against the USSR. In other words, Germany was fighting a two-front war. By that point, moreover, the Allies had already achieved complete air superiority over the Germans. The Luftwaffe no longer existed, so Allied soldiers didn’t have to worry about German “aerial artillery.”
None of these conditions are present in Iran.
The Iranians would outnumber any Western amphibious operation. There are 350,000 active members of the Artesh, 200,000 men in the Revolutionary Guard, and in the Basij, there are 90,000 active men, 400,000 in reserve, and up to one million or more mobilizable.
The Iranians, moreover, are not fighting a two-front ground war. It seems, however, that the U.S. is trying to solve this by using the Kurds as a distraction force to draw Iranian troops to the northwest while possible landings are carried out in the south. The problem there, obviously, is that from any angle, the Kurds do not pose a strong enough threat to force the Iranians to move most of their forces to the northwest. On the contrary, the Iranians are already keeping the Kurds in check using only missile and drone strikes, as well as a few quick, targeted ground actions. A Kurdish attack would also have to worry about its own rear areas facing Iraqi Shia militias, and the possibility of Turkish intervention.
Even air superiority is doubtful. Bombing missions against Iran avoid Iranian airspace. Planes fire from afar, whether from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or other countries. When they do enter Iranian airspace, they are often hit and end up crashing or having to make emergency landings. Iran may have lost or simply given up on using its own air force, but regarding its use as tactical support for infantry and marines, missiles and drones can perform the same function.
How feasible would the success of a ground operation be, with a large numerical inferiority, having to face a large part of the Iranian military force and without air superiority?
One could appeal to other historical examples. For example, the U.S. campaign in the Pacific against Japan? The first problem with the comparison is that most of the Japanese force was bogged down in Japan. What Japan had on its Pacific islands were small, scattered forces, with almost no air support and very little naval support. The final blow that convinced Japan to surrender, however, was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria with a large military force, not the U.S. amphibious operations.
The Crimean War? The reality there is that the Franco-British objective was extremely limited and, in fact, Russia also kept most of its troops near the Baltic to prevent an invasion from that direction, as well as near Poland.
The invasion of Sicily? We see a repetition of the scenarios and conditions already explained: Italy had already lost a large part of its troops in North Africa, no longer had air or naval support, was outnumbered, and the Italian government no longer wanted to fight and would soon stage a coup against Mussolini.
As for almost all other amphibious operations in the last 200 years? They failed. The classic case being the Gallipoli campaign, where the backward and fragile Ottoman army managed to pin down and hold the Entente’s two beachheads, grinding them down until forcing the British to evacuate their troops or transfer them to other fronts.
It is necessary to understand that water is one of the greatest difficulties of war, and few things protect a country better than the seas. How many times, for example, has the United Kingdom been invaded? Or even the U.S., which, relative to its main rivals, is as if it were an island?
Anyway, the U.S. might indeed make this decision, and if it is a limited operation, just to force negotiations, if accompanied by a devastating air campaign and a large-scale Kurdish invasion, then there is a small chance the operation could succeed. But there are many “ifs.”
The most likely outcome remains the failure of the amphibious operation and the waste of American lives.