Pakistan has found itself in the spotlight recently for less familiar reasons , with a palpable sense of euphoria across the country as it seeks what some have dubbed “ an unlikely rebrand ” from a nation gripped by terrorism and instability to a more statesmanly image as peacemaker. Its emergence as the venue for U.S.-Iran talks in the midst of an unprecedented regional war has spurred speculation that Islamabad is poised to become the “Oslo of the East,” a stage for high-stakes diplomacy. But behind the media images of officials walking into meeting rooms and holding closed-door talks, a more complicated reality lurks.
Hosting negotiations is not the same as having influence on how they turn out. Islamabad may well serve as an effective ‘Oslo,’ providing space and access, but whether Pakistan emerges as the next Norway, a trusted and reliable mediator, is a more ambitious proposition.
Pakistan’s selection for talks came about from a convergence of factors. Iran favoured Pakistan as a trusted interlocutor. It is a neighboring country and outside the immediate orbit of Western pressure. And Oman , which had previously hosted and mediated U.S.-Iran talks, was a party to the conflict, having been attacked at least five times by Iran . China’s endorsement of Pakistan was also critical because of the longstanding relations between Islamabad, Beijing and Tehran. On the American side, President Donald Trump’s strong relations with Field Marshal Asif Munir, whom he refers to as “his favorite field marshal,” made Islamabad an obvious choice for the negotiations. “Pakistan can maintain constructive relations with both Washington and Tehran simultaneously,” says Dr Mohamed Mohsen Abo El-Nour, Professor in Iranian Studies, Suez Canal University, Egypt. “There is a growing recognition within its leadership that its real strength lies not in choosing sides, but in balancing relationships, a rare skill in today’s polarized world.”
It is worth recalling that this is not Pakistan’s first rodeo. It played a major role in diplomacy leading to the 1988 Geneva Accords, ending the Soviet-Afghan war, and helped facilitate secret channels between the United States and China in the early 1970s. Those efforts were even more significant than the present U.S.-Iran negotiations; they resulted in Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in 1971, which paved the way for President Nixon’s historic 1972 visit and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China.
Then, as now, Pakistan was not acting alone. Its role formed part of multi-track diplomatic efforts involving several players. The current initiative, too, is part of a broader diplomatic choreography seen in parallel meetings held in Islamabad among the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other regional actors, all seeking input not only to the current regional war but also to establish “a political platform… which could succeed where the largely moribund Arab League has consistently fallen short,” as RS recently explained.
In terms of intermediation, the success of Oslo was based on Norway’s long-term cultivation of neutrality, institutional maturity and sustained diplomatic capacity, with Nordic neutrality becoming a trademark identity that built trust over time. By contrast, Pakistan brings a different set of assets to the table. Its established military-to-military channels worldwide, regional familiarity and tactical flexibility are useful in facilitating sensitive dialogue. Like Norway, Pakistan also contributes troops to post-conflict zones through its longstanding participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions .
Yet, as Amina Khan of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad notes, “Pakistan is not seeking to replicate Norway’s model of quiet, distant neutrality… It is shaping a more engaged, regionally anchored form of mediation that reflects its own geography and strategic realities.”
Pakistan’s approach, she argues, is “fundamentally different,” being “less about detachment and more about active regional stability. In this sense, Pakistan is embedded within the very conflicts it seeks to help de-escalate, and this proximity, while often seen as a limitation, may also be its greatest strength.”
Still, these strengths are tempered by structural constraints, including perceptions of political volatility and a limited institutional base for mediation. Hosting negotiations, however high-profile, does not equate to owning the actual peace process. Prematurely branding Pakistan as an “Oslo of the East” risks undermining the opportune conditions which have brought about the recent negotiations.
Nevertheless, Islamabad’s newfound visibility opens a window for strategic positioning. Pakistan tends to view its foreign policy through the lens of its rivalry with India, so shifting U.S. engagement dynamics are seen as a potential source of diplomatic leverage.
As retired Pakistani Maj. Gen. Tariq Rashid Khan explained, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been on the upswing in recent years. “During last year’s conflict with India, the performance of Pakistan’s military and the leadership demonstrated contributed to a perception of Pakistan as a more credible and dependable actor,” Khan said. “Now, by facilitating dialogue around U.S.-Iran tensions, it has enhanced its diplomatic credibility and leverage.”
Domestically, the moment is politically useful, allowing the civilian leadership to project relevance amid internal turbulence, including the incarceration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan . The highly visible (and televised) coordination between civilian authorities and the military leadership, with Munir playing a prominent role, is carefully managed to signal internal cohesion and institutional alignment. In Pakistan’s political history, where the military has often acted as a guardian of state stability, these displays carry a performative quality. Despite Pakistan’s rising diplomatic profile, becoming a peacemaking hub would require far more than hosting a single round of talks. It depends on building institutional capacity, maintaining greater consistency in foreign policy and securing international buy-in beyond its close relationship with China. It would also mean navigating an increasingly crowded space, where Gulf Arab states, European intermediaries and smaller neutral countries are all jockeying to be seen as credible conveners of dialogue. There is “cautious optimism” about Pakistan’s growing role because of Islamabad’s practical approach to the issue, said retired Danish Lt. Col. Steen Kjaergaard of the Royal Danish Defence College. “That pragmatism, and its willingness to engage across divides, even in sensitive contexts, is noteworthy,” Kjaergaard noted. “But whether Pakistan can evolve into a future ‘Oslo’ remains uncertain, given limitations around leadership, global legitimacy and its proximity to India. Compared to mediators such as Qatar, it also lacks the same financial muscle, which is often key to sustaining long-term diplomatic efforts.”
Pakistan’s ascendance as a global intermediary is undeniable. But, while it may prove to be an effective host, the distinction between intermediary and mediator is not just a matter of semantics. An intermediary provides space, logistics and discretion. A mediator, by contrast, shapes agendas, maintains processes over time and builds continuity across multiple conflicts. On this basis, Pakistan today appears to fall into the former category. Still, if the cards are played right, Islamabad and its crop of leaders could yet position Pakistan as a far more consequential diplomatic force than it has been for decades.