This month, the United States launched its annual “Flintlock” military exercises in Libya for the first time. For the U.S., these multinational drills represent an opportunity to limit Chinese and Russian influence in the country and a “significant step forward for military integration in Libya,” which has been divided into dueling governments in the east and west for the past decade.
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the strongman of eastern Libya and a former CIA asset , is hoping to use this moment to cement his grip on power. The military leader has over the past decade become a leading figure in Libyan politics, owing in large part to his control over military and energy infrastructure throughout the country.
But, at the advanced age of 82, he has been relegated to the role of kingmaker behind the curtain, positioning his sons to carry on his legacy and solidify the family’s control over Libya. If he succeeds, he could well reproduce the experience of his predecessor and rival, the late Col. Muammar Gaddafi, who led the country for more than 40 years before being unseated and killed in 2011.
Flintlock 2026
Earlier this month, Massad Boulos, senior adviser to President Donald Trump for Arab and Middle East affairs, persuaded the Libyans to put a temporary end to their east-west rivalry through an agreement on unified spending between the two competing governments: the Government of National Unity based in the capital Tripoli under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the parallel Government of National Stability led by Osama Hammad, which is backed by Haftar.
The “Flintlock 2026” maneuvers, which are sponsored by AFRICOM and involve about 1,500 troops from 30 countries, are bringing together forces from eastern and western Libya for the first time. Boulos placed the exercises at the heart of the political process, describing them as an opportunity to “raise the professionalism of Libyan officers.” In practice, this represents an American imprimatur for entrenching Haftar’s dominant role in Libyan politics and elevating his family from warlords to international security partners. Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and deputy, was, after all, seated next to Lt. Gen. John Brennan, the deputy commander of AFRICOM, during the exercises.
Many Libyans question the usefulness of these initiatives, seeing them as nothing more than a temporary painkiller, proof that American efforts are not a solution to the crisis but merely a way of managing it. While the effort to unify the state budget brought a temporary reprieve, it did not resolve the root causes of the power struggle.
It seems that the debt of history still governs Washington’s view of Libya. After the phrase “to the shores of Tripoli” that echoes in the U.S. Marine Corps hymn, American forces have returned once again to the Gulf of Sirte.
Sirte: Former ‘line of death’
Sirte, which the Reagan administration bombed in 1986 under the pretext of dismantling Gaddafi’s regime, is now welcoming AFRICOM officers there to bless the birth of a new military dynasty led by Haftar’s sons.
For the first time, Libya appears as the official host of these joint operations. Brennan described the step as embodying “the vision of leaders from both sides.” Yet the irony lies in transforming Sirte from a geopolitical “ line of death ” for the former Libyan regime into an attempt to reproduce the “strongman” model that Washington has long claimed it seeks to dismantle.
Former Libyan Defense Minister Mohammed al-Barghathi believes the scene carries many contradictions. In an interview, he said: “As much as it pleases us to see Libyan officers meeting together, it hurts in our souls that this invitation is taking place on their own soil and under the management of an external party, under the pretext of unifying the military institution.”
In the same conversation, al-Barghathi questioned Washington’s credibility, recalling previous promises by U.S. defense secretaries to install electronic surveillance systems on the southern borders and to hand over four Libyan aircraft held by the United States since the 1969 coup that brought Gaddafi to power. “Those aircraft have today become military scrap after decades beyond their operational life,” he added bitterly, “and American promises never went beyond words that were never fulfilled on the ground.”
The return from exile
Haftar emerged as one of Libya’s most important political actors since he launched Operation Dignity in 2014, launching a military offensive that unseated an Islamist government in Benghazi, the largest city in eastern Libya.
Hafter allied himself with the House of Representatives, a body elected in a national vote in 2014 that would later endorse the Government of National Stability. This relationship helped his military ascent and made him the commander of the National Army with the rank of Field Marshal — the first of its kind in Libya – as a reward for his efforts to “purify the country from the filth of extremists and the Muslim Brotherhood,” as he once told me.
But now, 12 years after his rise and six years after his failure to capture the capital Tripoli, Haftar and his family’s ambitions for power and wealth have mixed together through a model of indirect control.
Militarization of the economy
Haftar’s influence is not limited to military affairs; it also relies on an economic network linked to the army and the family in ways designed to enhance both his political and military influence.
He also benefits from informal exports through companies linked to his son Saddam, which exported about 7.6 million barrels of oil, worth $600 million, outside official channels between May and December 2024. In 2025, average production reached 1.37–1.375 million barrels per day, the highest level in 12 years, with oil revenues amounting to about $22 billion — a 15% increase from the previous year.
Haftar uses his control to threaten the closure of oil fields in order to obtain a larger share of revenues or political concessions, as his economic power depends heavily on his control of the Sirte Basin.
Family ambition
Studies indicate that Haftar’s forces form a broad alliance of armed groups also linked to economic interests in eastern Libya.
Saddam became his father’s deputy after leading military units that play a central role in the power structure and exert influence over economic deals related to reconstruction.
A senior commander in Haftar’s forces said the elevation of Haftar's sons represented an effort to consolidate power between senior and junior leadership in the army. Another officer who preferred not to be named said that the situation appears stable inside the army for now, but it could change quickly if Haftar’s influence diminishes in one way or another.
A UN Panel of Experts report accused Saddam, in partnership with Ibrahim Dbeibah (the son-in-law of Prime Minister Dbeibah), of managing an unprecedented system of “institutional corruption” in the energy sector by exploiting his influence to provide political and security cover that enabled criminal networks to escape punishment entirely.
Khaled Haftar holds the position of Chief of Staff of the army, which numbers about 90,000 fighters, with an unofficial budget estimated at 5 billion dinars ($800 million) for salaries and operations, not to mention the value of weapons and their secret deals, which far exceed that amount.
But the most important of Haftar’s sons is the undeclared one: the eldest, al-Siddiq, who most resembles his father in appearance and character. He has gone beyond the role of loyal assistant to become the keeper of his father’s secrets and his de facto foreign minister.
Al-Siddiq once told me in a private conversation in Cairo that he dreams of heading the government. But he bristles at allegations that his family will become like the Gaddafis. “We are a different family and necessarily our experience does not represent others,” he told me in 2024. He was the only one who accompanied Haftar when he entered the military hospital in Paris for treatment following a health crisis he suffered during a visit to Cairo years ago.
Washington and a new dictatorship
The path the Haftar family is taking today goes beyond traditional military ambition; it is an attempt to legitimize family influence through parallel institutions that guarantee financial and security sustainability.
With presidential elections indefinitely postponed, Haftar is no longer able to claim the throne of the country. But he has now necessarily become the maker of new kings who bear his name.
Will Washington repeat its classic mistake of supporting the “strongman” to preserve temporary stability, only to wake up later to a more complex and corrupt family dictatorship? Talk of “unifying institutions” risks becoming the wholesale privatization of the army and oil in favor of a single family — with American blessing.