As the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran enters a more “ dangerous and unpredictable ” phase, regional powers are scrambling to contain the fallout.
With energy markets already rattled and the risk of spillover across the Persian Gulf and beyond growing by the day, Pakistan convened a two-day meeting starting on Sunday with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to address the situation. The talks reportedly explored de-escalation and the possibility of hosting direct negotiations between the U.S. and Iran on Pakistani soil.
Whether this last ditch effort by regional states to avoid being drawn into an expanding war will lead to a genuine diplomatic opening remains uncertain, though the stakes could hardly be higher. The talks also come alongside a five-point initiative announced jointly by Pakistan and China to restore peace and stability in the Gulf and Middle East. Without a doubt, this is no longer a contained conflict. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz , through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes, has already triggered a spike in energy prices. The crisis risks disrupting global supply chains and aggravating inflation and food insecurity . The Islamabad talks are the first serious attempt to stem a war that is fast becoming a systemic economic and geopolitical shock.
To be sure, Pakistan’s step forward was less out of diplomatic ambition than of necessity. Among the countries most exposed to the fallout, Pakistan cannot afford to take sides in the conflict. Its economy and energy security are closely tied to the Gulf, while Iran, with which it shares a roughly 550 mile border, cannot be antagonized without consequence. With tensions already running high with India and Afghanistan , any clear alignment would exacerbate its predicament. For Pakistan, the aim is to buy time — that is, delay escalation as much as possible and keep space open for diplomacy. Domestically, even limited efforts to steer parties back toward negotiation are presented as evidence of responsible leadership , burnishing Pakistan’s image as a credible intermediary.
“Pakistan has enormous stakes in the outcome of this war. We also have decades of engagement with Washington’s military and foreign policy establishments, which means there is a shared language and a degree of mutual understanding that facilitates this kind of sensitive diplomacy,” Jamal Aziz, Executive Director of the Islamabad-based think tank Research Society of International Law, told RS. “A mediator with skin in the game is often more effective than a disinterested one, because both sides know we have every incentive to make diplomacy succeed.”
Complicating matters, however, are Pakistan’s defense pact with Saudi Arabia , which may carry expectations of support, and Pakistan’s shared vulnerabilities with Iran in regions such as Balochistan . Energy interdependence adds yet another layer of urgency. Islamabad’s objective is not to broker a grand settlement on the scale of the Peace of Westphalia, but to slow the pace of escalation. A reluctant mediator operating through buffer state diplomacy, Pakistan needs above all to end aa conflict that threatens its interests on multiple fronts.
If Pakistan is acting under constraints, Turkey is drawing on a familiar diplomatic playbook. Ankara’s approach can best be described as active non-belligerence, opting for crisis diplomacy while avoiding direct military entanglement. During the Syrian conflict, Turkey helped establish the Astana process alongside Russia and Iran, creating a framework to reduce violence and maintain communication between adversaries. In Gaza, Ankara pushed for contact group diplomacy that placed civilian protection at the center while working to mobilize concerted international pressure.
Similarly, the Islamabad initiative is looking to foster regional coordination, keep dialogue channels open and reduce the risk of external actors exploiting fragmentation. Yet these mechanisms have inherent limits. Turkey may bring diplomatic experience to the table, but it does not alter the balance of forces driving the conflict.
Rather than a unified front, these regional stakeholders form a loose alignment held together by shared anxieties and no common strategy. Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt all fear escalation and front row exposure to economic shock, but each has its own preoccupations. Riyadh is focused on security and oil market stability, Ankara guards its strategic autonomy, and Islamabad is managing a delicate balancing act to preserve its own stability.
Cairo, however, is not only reacting to economic pressures around the Suez Canal and inflation, but also asserting its seniority as a longstanding regional heavyweight, an elder of sorts, reluctant to cede diplomatic initiative to emerging intermediaries.
“By relaying messages between Washington and Tehran, Cairo is positioning itself as a mediator in one of the most volatile conflicts in decades, while signaling that the stakes extend beyond the battlefield to a global economic shock,” says Mahmoud M. Abdallah, an Egyptian researcher in global affairs. “The summit’s call for diplomacy, support for Pakistan hosting U.S.-Iran talks and limited confidence-building steps in the Strait of Hormuz indicate a collective recognition that de-escalation is imperative but also Egypt’s determination to exercise leadership in shaping that process," he told RS.
While not yet formally articulated, coordination among these major players may also hint at the early stages of a more institutionalized bloc of Muslim-majority states, an idea floated by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan , who has in recent years called for a more unified and robust partnership. Envisioned not as a military alliance or “ Arab NATO ,” but a political platform that could build on the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), this new grouping could succeed where the largely moribund Arab League has consistently fallen short. “What we are seeing in Islamabad (are) regional actors stepping into that vacuum, upholding through backchannel diplomacy what the formal multilateral system was supposed to deliver but cannot,” says Aziz. “Respect for territorial sovereignty, the sanctity of agreements and the principle that wars must end through negotiation, not annihilation."
"The norms have not yet failed," he added. "The institutions enforcing them have. What Islamabad represents is an effort to build new mechanisms to carry those norms forward.”
This “coalition of the constrained” may succeed to a certain extent in preventing worst case outcomes, but several structural obstacles stand in the way of these efforts. First is the trust deficit between Iran and the United States, caused by a recurring pattern in which diplomatic engagement coincides with, or is followed by, military escalation, leaving Tehran reluctant to enter talks without verifiable guarantees. Second, and perhaps most notably, is the absence of Israel from the process, despite its role in the conflict dynamics and its capacity, particularly when operating in coordination with Washington, to carry out strikes that can undercut any diplomatic overture. This renders any negotiation track susceptible to developments outside the room, regardless of mediation efforts. Third is Washington’s strategic ambiguity, as it signals openness to dialogue while maintaining coercive pressure, fueling doubts about the sincerity and durability of any process. Finally, external pressures may gradually narrow the space for regional actors to maneuver, compelling them to align more explicitly with competing blocs. Ultimately, the Islamabad initiative is an attempt to buy time. For regional states, the trick is to avoid entrapment in an expanding war while still wielding a measure of influence through diplomacy. Their success is likely to be mitigated, perhaps even sabotaged, by absent principals and entrenched rivalries. It remains to be seen whether this moment evolves into a genuine gateway for negotiations, or whether it is later remembered as a fleeting pause before the space for diplomatic choice narrowed irreversibly.