The US and Iran Versions of the MOU Show Major Areas of Disagreement


MOU, minus 3 and counting. The image above illustrates a major problem not directly addressed in the MOU, and I will explain more at the end of this piece. What is in the actual memo? Israeli politicians and their Zionist collaborators in the United States are going wild after seeing Iranian press reports that outline the deal that Donald Trump is prepared to sign with Iran. Although the White House has not released the text of the MOU — which would allow us to compare the US version with the Iranian version that has been posted on line — the Western media has caught up with the Iranian media, which posted the. 14-point MOU yesterday.

Bloomberg News (as of June 16–17, 2026), claims to have obtained a copy of the MOU that the US and Iran are preparing to formally sign on June 19 in Switzerland (likely at the Bürgenstock resort near Lucerne). This interim agreement aims to halt the ongoing war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and set the stage for 60 days of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and broader issues. You can read Bloomberg’s account of the contents of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at this link (warning, it is behind a paywall

If the respective US and Iranian reports are true, then there are significant differences still separating the two sides. Bloomberg’s reporting (based on drafts it reviewed) and Iranian versions (primarily from state-affiliated Mehr News and officials) of the proposed 14-point US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) show significant overlap on core elements but notable differences in emphasis, specifics, and interpretation — especially on financial relief, Hormuz management, and future negotiations.

The alleged US and Iranian versions concur on the following points: Immediate & permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, with no further hostile actions. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz : Iran ends its closure/blockade; US lifts its naval blockade. Commercial shipping resumes (aiming for pre-war volumes). Sanctions relief : Waivers for Iranian oil sales immediately or very soon; broader relief tied to compliance. 60-day negotiation window : For a comprehensive deal, focusing primarily on Iran’s nuclear program (enrichment, stockpiles, inspections), with Iran reaffirming no nuclear weapons. Economic incentives : Reconstruction/development program for Iran involving at least $300 billion (from regional partners/Gulf states, not direct US funds release of some frozen assets.

Despite the insistence by both the US and Iran that the MOU will be signed on Friday, there are clear differences between the Iranian and US versions that, if not resolved, I believe will torpedo the signing ceremony. There are seven major areas of disagreement observable in the public versions: Preconditions for entering negotiations: Iranian version explicitly states that final negotiations will not begin until some oil sanctions are suspended, part of the frozen assets are released, and the naval blockade is lifted — making US action a precondition for Iran coming to the table. US/Bloomberg: Broader potential (nuclear + other issues like regional behavior). The US version conditions Iranian benefits on Iranian performance. Frozen assets: Bloomberg/US-leaning drafts : Emphasize phased, performance-based relief (e.g., oil sales waivers first, then broader access tied to nuclear compliance). Reconstruction fund (~$300B) is conditional on a final deal. A senior US official told reporters the deal was strictly “pay for performance” — no funds released without Iranian compliance first. Iranian versions (e.g., Mehr Highlight more immediate/concrete gains, such as release of $24–25 billion in frozen assets during the 60 days, half upfront or quicker oil sanctions waivers, and stronger commitments to reconstruction funding. Iran’s Mehr News version specifies $12 billion of Iran’s frozen funds to be released before negotiations begin, with another $12 billion released during the 60-day final negotiation window — $24 billion total. Scope of final negotiations: Iran’s version limits the final talks strictly to nuclear and economic/sanctions issues — explicitly excluding Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for regional proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.). This is in direct conflict with Trump’s stated position that missiles and proxies must be on the table. Sanctions relief scope: Iran’s version calls for the lifting of oil and petrochemical sanctions and a US commitment to withdraw forces from areas surrounding Iran and impose no new sanctions or force deployments during negotiations. The Bloomberg version does not include explicit sanctions relief commitments upfront. Iran’s nuclear commitments: Iran’s version has Iran reaffirming its NPT commitment not to produce nuclear weapons. The US position, as stated by Trump to the New York Times, is that Iran must be permanently blocked from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon, which implies far more intrusive verification and limits on enrichment than a simple NPT reaffirmation. UN Security Council ratification: Iran’s version calls for any final agreement to be approved through a UN Security Council resolution — a significant demand that would give China and Russia a formal role in guaranteeing and potentially enforcing the deal, which the U.S. has not acknowledged. Strait of Hormuz : Bloomberg/US view : Full reopening to pre-war commercial traffic without tolls , safe passage, and return to normal flows (potentially within ~30 days). Iranian view : Reopening yes, but under Iranian (and Omani) sovereignty/management. Iran may impose “service fees” (not called “tolls”) for security/environmental reasons; separate rules for military vs. civilian vessels.

I think there are at least two possibilities for why an authentic copy of the final MOU has not yet been release — First, the two sides are still negotiating the language and substance or Second, Trump wants to keep the official version hidden from the public until the MOU is signed in order to keep opponents of the genuine deal in the dark. Do you have another explanation?

This brings me back to the Strait of Hormuz and the image posted at the top of this article. My Monday article showed a large number of Iranian ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Today’s image shows large clusters of non-Iranian ships at anchor north and south of the Strait. Although the Pentagon insists that the blockade will not be lifted until Friday’s signing ceremony, it is clear that Iranian ships are moving freely through the Strait of Hormuz while non-Iranian ships are not.

The non-Iranian ships, as you can see, are clustered together north and south of the Strait most likely because insurance companies apparently are not ready to give them the green light to pass through the Strait until the mines are cleared. Although Trump insists that ships can start moving as soon as the MOU is signed, the presence of mines will delay the ships setting sail, perhaps for several months. The Pentagon’s own internal estimate still places full minesweeping operations at up to six months, even using three dedicated minesweeping vessels already in the region — which means the strait may be politically open but physically hazardous for normal commercial shipping for months to come.

If the MOU is signed on Friday, reversing the economic damage from the closure and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will take months. Iranian ships loaded with oil will still face at least a month, if not two months, journey to their destination. In other words, new supplies of oil from Iran will not be off-loaded until the end of August at the earliest. Signing the MOU does not end the economic turmoil roiling global markets.

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Commander Farinazo joined Marcello and me for our regular Tuesday chat: Jelena and Ryan, hosts of East Calling, asked me to provide a strategic update on the US/Iran MOU: I did another emergency appearance with Nima on the various MOU versions circulating on the web: Mario and I had an enlightening discussion: I spent almost an hour chatting with Sabby Sabs about the Iran deal, but we also discussed the B-52 crash: It is becoming a habit… I closed out the night with Sulaiman Ahmed: --- I thank you for your invaluable support by taking time to read or comment. I do not charge a subscription fee nor do I accept advertising. I want the content to be accessible to everyone interested in the issues I am discussing. However, if you wish to make a donation, please see this link .

Published: Modified: Back to Voices