Washington says that last week it struck Iran-aligned terrorists in Iraq. Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces say that American and Saudi aircraft hit an official Iraqi security headquarters. The unsettling possibility is that both claims are true.
On July 28, U.S. and Saudi fighter aircraft attacked multiple sites in eastern Iraq. U.S. Central Command said the targets were logistics and weapons facilities linked to more than 30 drone attacks directed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard over the previous 72 hours. Saudi Arabia said drones launched from Iraq had targeted oil facilities in its Eastern Province. Iran denied directing the attacks. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella name used by Iran-aligned factions, also denied responsibility and suggested that Yemen’s Houthis were involved. Neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia have publicly included evidence identifying the groups that launched the drones.
The PMF said several of its bases were struck, killing at least 20 members and wounding 32. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi ordered an investigation into the Saudi allegations, and the Iraqi military pledged to prevent the country’s territory from being used to attack neighboring states. The investigation will show whether Baghdad can treat these factions as forces under its command or where they’re armed political powers capable of refusing its orders.
A Force Inside and Outside the State
Iraq has spent more than a decade avoiding a clear answer. It brought armed factions into the state, placed them on public payrolls, and gave them legal standing. Some of these factions kept their own commanders, political alliances, and regional relationships. The arrangement helped Iraq survive the Islamic State’s assault. It also made the blurred boundary between militia and state part of the governing order .
The PMF grew rapidly during the national emergency of 2014, after the Iraqi army collapsed in Mosul and the Islamic State seized vast territory. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on Iraqis to defend the country. Volunteers joined the fight, along with armed organizations that had existed for years. PMF units helped to halt the Islamic State’s advance and participated in the campaigns that ended its territorial rule. Many Iraqis remember that service with pride.
In 2016, Parliament passed Law No. 40 , recognizing the PMF as part of Iraq’s armed forces and placing it under the commander-in-chief. The law also barred members from partisan political activity. Baghdad had created an official institution on paper. A statute, though, could not erase the separate histories, loyalties, and command networks inside a broad coalition.
The PMF has never been one militia. Its formations differ in leadership, ideology, local roots, religious ties, and closeness to Iran. Some have moved further into formal Iraqi command. Others have retained considerable freedom of action. The real sovereignty problem lies with factions that combine official status and public resources with the ability to make military choices outside normal government control.
Legal Status Did Not Create Obedience
Iraq has already seen the danger at home. In July 2025, fighters linked to Kataib Hezbollah clashed with federal police at a government office in Baghdad, leaving three people dead. A government investigation later cited formations operating outside the chain of command. The prime minister removed brigade commanders and referred participants to the judiciary. The episode exposed a basic fact: being legally inside the security system did not guarantee obedience to it.
The danger grows when these factions act beyond Iraq. State status gives a faction money, offices, access, and political protection. A separate command structure leaves room for independent operations. Allies in Parliament and the bureaucracy can obstruct accountability. Then a foreign strike changes the political conversation. This ambiguity survives because it serves more than military interests.
Armed factions also possess parties, parliamentary allies, and access to ministries. The same political system expected to discipline them often depends on their support. A prime minister may possess formal authority as commander-in-chief and still face a coalition capable of blocking legislation, mobilizing supporters, or threatening instability. Command is therefore a political contest, not simply an administrative problem. The struggle isn’t simply over resources but over the very survival of governments.
Foreign Strikes Strengthen Militias
Before the bombs fall, Iraqis may focus inward, asking who authorized an attack that exposed the country to retaliation. Afterward, the argument shifts outward to violated airspace, foreign aggression, and national dignity. A faction accused of acting without state approval can then present itself as a victim defending Iraq. Officials who call for restraining that faction must first address public anger over the foreign attack.
Airstrikes may destroy weapons and still leave the targeted faction politically stronger. Destroying a warehouse or launch site may stop an immediate threat. It cannot settle who controls force inside Iraq. The targeted faction gains fresh support for its claim that disarmament would leave the country defenseless. Its leaders can avoid questions about unauthorized action by pointing to the aircraft that entered Iraqi airspace.
Baghdad is then exposed in two directions. Drone or missile attacks launched from within Iraq without clear authorization tell neighboring states that the Iraqi government cannot control its own territory. Foreign retaliation shows Iraqis that their government cannot protect it, and the country becomes a battlefield for regional conflict.
Describing Iraq as trapped between the United States and Iran captures part of the story. Both powers have used Iraq as an arena for competition. Iraqi leaders also made choices that deepened the country’s vulnerability. They legalized a fragmented armed coalition and funded it before establishing a single command capable of enforcing national decisions.
The Real Test of Iraqi Sovereignty
Al-Zaidi’s government has now set September 30 as the deadline for armed groups outside state control to disarm . That deadline offers a direct test. Handing over selected weapons will change little if factions keep autonomous commanders, hidden arsenals, or political channels that protect independent action. Integration has meaning only when the Iraqi government controls deployments, targets, and decisions to use force.
None of this requires dismantling the PMF or denying its role in defeating the Islamic State. It requires a distinction between fighters who accept national command and factions that use public resources to pursue their own military agendas. Any organization receiving Iraqi salaries, facilities, and legal protection must accept Iraqi authority over war-making decisions. If it reserves those decisions for itself, it remains only partly inside the state, no matter what the law says.
Washington also needs to understand the political limits of bombing. Attacks may remove weapons and disrupt operations. Striking sites described in Iraq as official security headquarters also strengthens the ambiguity that has protected autonomous factions for years. Foreign governments treat these groups as outside the state when they strike. The groups invoke their position inside the state when they demand protection.
The issue raised by last week’s attacks is larger than the origin of a drone. It is who ultimately has the authority to choose Iraq’s enemies and expose its citizens to war. Baghdad will not prove its sovereignty by issuing condemnations after foreign aircraft leave. It will prove it when no armed organization can use Iraqi territory, launch an attack, and invite retaliation without the government’s approval.
Until then, Iraq’s strongest armed factions will retain the advantage they have built into the system: the state shields them when bombs fall, but it cannot always stop them from creating the next crisis.
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What Was America Attacking in Iraq?
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