Israel is going all out to stop Turkey from getting F-35s

For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey's return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.

At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..

Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey's domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.

But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's words, " destroy the power balance " in the region. The phrase invokes Israel's “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.

Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel's claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.

How Turkey was pushed out

Turkey's search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.

But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure .

The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen , who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.

Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey's defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave .” Repeated at rallies , Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.

This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.

Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet , with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.

How Israel built a case against Turkey's return

Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was " not a friend " and could not be trusted.

The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel's targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, "these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear." The reference to "these policies" and "this mindset" pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel's isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance .

But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel's erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary . Netanyahu carried it further on Fox , telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.

The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel's right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric , repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles . Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.

Balance for whom?

The most revealing element of Netanyahu's argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would "destroy the power balance," he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority . Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100 , while Ankara's immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey's return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.

Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of "aggressive aspirations," Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon , Syria , Yemen , Iran , Qatar , and Gaza . In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu's "balance" is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel's air superiority and freedom to strike.

Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel's qualitative military edge , a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar , the UAE , Saudi Arabia , and Egypt . Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.

But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance's southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO's requirements.

Israel's concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump's broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, " nobody tells me what we should be selling or not ."

Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel's security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.