Iran launched its first direct ballistic missile strike against Israel on Sunday night since the fragile 8 April ceasefire went into effect.
Tehran made clear its strike was in retaliation for Israeli strikes against the Dahiyeh district in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, which it had previously signalled would violate a red line compelling it to respond, which it did.
Rather than aiming to restart the war , however, Tehran seems intent on restoring a degree of deterrence with its Israeli enemy without escalating beyond a limited series of tit-for-tat strikes, much like what it attempted in its first direct attacks on Israel in 2024.
Whether it can do so remains to be seen as Israel appears determined to bring about a regime collapse in Tehran. True Promise I-V Sunday’s strikes recall Iran’s Operation True Promise I and II, single-day bombardments executed on 13 April and 1 October 2024, respectively, rather than the two most recent wars of June 2025 and 28 February to 8 April this year.
In True Promise I, Iran was retaliating for an Israeli airstrike that destroyed the Iranian consulate annex building in Syria’s capital, Damascus.
Tehran telegraphed the strike in advance by launching slow-moving drones hours before firing ballistic missiles at Israel, enabling Israel and its allies plenty of time to prepare defences.
True Promise II was in retaliation for Israel’s subsequent assassinations of senior Hamas member Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and long-time Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. Iran used approximately 200 ballistic missiles for that attack, which came with much less forewarning than its predecessor.
Israel retaliated on both occasions with long-range targeted airstrikes before launching its more extensive 12-day air war the following June, and the most recent war in close coordination with the US military, both unprecedented campaigns.
Iran responded last June with True Promise III, which largely focused on hitting Israel with missiles and a single symbolic attack on a Qatari airbase hosting US troops.
In True Promise VI earlier this year, Tehran went much further by unleashing drone and missile barrages against all of the Arab Gulf states and closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Now, in what was predictably codenamed True Promise V, Iran seems more intent on replicating the models of True Promise I and II: controlled escalations and demonstrations that it will swiftly strike Israel whenever it violates declared red lines.
At the same time, Israel did not hesitate to hit back with yet more airstrikes inside Iran. Reestablishing deterrence “Iran attacked Israel for a simple reason: It wanted to show that it won’t tolerate being pushed off the Lebanon file,” Arash Azizi, a lecturer at Yale University and author of ‘The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions’ as well as an upcoming book on the history of Iran-Israel relations, told The New Arab .
“It was reacting to the effective ‘separation of fronts’,” he said.
Hezbollah has long been Iran’s most important ally in the Middle East. During the US-Israeli war this year, the group restarted fighting Israel for the first time since the 27 November 2024 ceasefire.
Israel had inflicted several major blows against the group in late 2024 through a devastating air campaign, the unprecedented explosive pager operation, and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah , who had served as the group’s leader since 1992.
“The missile strikes in Israel were relatively limited and more likely an attempt to reestablish deterrence than to restart major military operations against Israel,” James Devine, associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Mount Allison University, told TNA .
Iran’s military announced Monday that it was ceasing attacks on Israel for now but warned that any additional Israeli strikes against Iran or south Lebanon would mean “much harsher and more forceful actions than before will follow”.
Devine recalled statements made by the Iranian military over the past week suggesting that attacking Dahiyeh would constitute a red line for Tehran. Consequently, after Israel’s strikes on that suburb, Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold, Iran had “little choice” but to respond with a show of force.
“Tehran also has to worry about its reputation with its allies,” Devine said. “If it were to turn its back on Hezbollah now, after it had entered the war on Iran’s behalf in March, none of their allies would ever trust them again.”
Interestingly, Iran seems to have used its most advanced ballistic missile, the Fattah-1, during True Promise V. Writing on X , Iran military analyst, Farzin Nadimi, assessed that it’s possible that Tehran “designed their Fattah-1 flight trajectories so that they flew to northern Israel via southern Lebanon or as close to southern Lebanon as possible, to boost the morale of their ailing Hezbollah allies”.
In the regional wars that followed Hamas’ fateful 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, the Israeli military has systematically targeted the various militia groups that make up Iran’s self-styled Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah.
Nevertheless, Devine believes that Hezbollah has proven its capacity to “bounce back remarkably well” from the severe damage sustained in 2024 and 2025. Therefore, it remains an “important pillar” in Tehran’s overall defence strategy.
“The dynamics of deterrence in this case are complex, though,” he said. “The target audience for Tehran’s signalling was probably the US as much as it was Israel.”
Tehran has insisted in its ongoing negotiations with Washington that any ceasefire must include Lebanon in addition to the Gulf. Accordingly, Tehran has criticised Washington as fighting on the Lebanese front has escalated, alleging that it doesn’t have what Devine calls the “political will” to rein in its Israeli ally.
“The missile strikes in Israel were therefore likely a message to the Trump administration signalling that Iran was willing to sacrifice the negotiating process to protect its allies, if necessary,” Devine said.
Azizi also noted that Iran’s latest strikes were “as much a reaction against Israel as to Lebanon’s leadership.” The latter accused Iran on Friday of using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip” in its negotiations with the United States.
“With Israel having now attacked back, Iran is in a delicate position,” Azizi said. “It could call it a day and use the momentum to reach a deal with the US or allow the war to expand again.”
The Iran analyst assesses that the new leadership in Tehran may prove more willing to escalate today than the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was during True Promise I-II.
“They are more willing to escalate than Khamenei but also know their limits and will probably seek a deal if they can get their key demands, such as the release of Iranian frozen assets,” Azizi said.
US President Donald Trump has said he will not authorise the unfreezing of Iranian assets before a peace deal. Undeterred Israel Devine noted that Trump has tried to “decouple” US negotiations with Iran from the Lebanon situation and seemingly supported Israeli strikes against southern Beirut in retaliation for Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel’s northern border regions.
On the other hand, after the latest attack, he called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and urged restraint.
“I think Israel has responded enough; they don’t need to respond anymore,” Trump reportedly said . The comment followed a heated phone call last week in which the American president cursed at the Israeli premier over the military escalation in Lebanon.
“President Trump does appear to have understood Tehran’s message,” Devine said. “The question now is whether he can control Israel. There are increasing signs that Israel will not be deterred and is reluctant to bow to US pressure.”
Since the October 2023 attacks and subsequent regional wars, Israel has “appeared bent” on implementing regime change in Tehran and destroying Hamas and Hezbollah. As part of these objectives, it has continued and expanded operations in Lebanon despite US criticism.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu has talked openly about “recalibrating relations” with the US to lessen Israel’s dependence on American arms and support, even going so far as to say Israel needs to become a “super Sparta” in the region.
“If Israel is indeed committed to reordering the region, Tehran’s efforts to reestablish deterrence may be moot,” Devine said.
In addition to Iranian missile attacks on Israel and Israeli airstrikes against Iran, the Houthis in Yemen launched a missile aimed at Israel early on Monday. Devine believes this latter action can be interpreted in “terms of a deterrent threat” primarily directed toward the US rather than Israel.
“The implicit message is that if the Israelis persist, the Houthis will become involved, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait can be closed down too,” Devine said.
“It is too soon to say if this will wind down or spiral out of control, but this does appear to be a critical juncture in the conflict.” Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in the Middle East who writes extensively about the region's affairs, conflicts, and politics Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon Edited by Charlie Hoyle