When US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters last week that Iran’s missile programme and regional proxies “most certainly will come up in these conversations” during his three-day Gulf tour, Tehran quickly pushed back, making clear that its missile programme was off the table.
At a press briefing, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei said the missile programme was not part of the talks with the United States, echoing earlier remarks by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, a key mediator in the US-Iran negotiations.
During their meeting in Islamabad last week, both clarified that the programme was not included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 17 June.
US President Donald Trump also defended the decision to keep Iran’s missile programme out of the negotiations. At the G7 summit in Paris two weeks ago, Trump said that “if other countries have them, it's a little bit unfair for them not to have some".
But this was not always the US position. One of Trump’s war goals was to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities and prevent it from rebuilding them. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also lobbied the Trump administration, citing Iran’s missile programme as a justification for military action .
The ceasefire in the Middle East is currently facing renewed pressure. Over the weekend, the US launched strikes on Iranian targets after a disputed ceasefire breach, prompting Iran to retaliate with drone and missile attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait.
The escalation has put the fragile negotiations at risk, with disputes over control of the Strait of Hormuz , sanctions, and Iran’s nuclear programme still unresolved.
Yet the absence of Iran’s missile programme from the 14-point MoU, which gives the two countries 60 days to reach a final deal, preserves a strategic asset Tehran has built over time, one that provides deterrence , defence, and leverage all at once, and that Iran is unlikely to give up.
“Iran has never been willing to discuss its missile programme, which it sees as an essential part of its strategic deterrence against Israel and, to a lesser extent, the United States,” former diplomat and Middle East Institute distinguished diplomatic fellow Alan Eyre told The New Arab .
He added that Washington lacks the leverage to force Tehran into such talks, making negotiations over its missiles or support for proxies unlikely.
Tehran drew a red line around Iran’s missile programme even during the 2025 negotiations with the Trump administration before the 12-day war, and again in the rounds of talks in 2026 before 28 February.
“Since direct confrontation with Israel in 2024, Iran has realised its missiles are essential to its security because they can inflict harm on Israel in ways its regional partners and proxies no longer can, making reliance on its own conventional capabilities a significant feature of its new national security doctrine,” Ali Vaez, International Crisis Group’s Iran project director, told TNA .
“If Iran was reluctant to accept limits on its ballistic missile programme before, now it would be impossible to ask it to do so.” The rise of Iran's missile programme Iran’s ballistic missile programme was born during the Iran-Iraq war, as Tehran sought to offset its conventional military weaknesses and lack of modern air power.
Over time, Iran moved from imported systems toward a largely domestic long-range missile force and integrated missiles, drones, and regional proxy networks into a doctrine of “forward defence” designed to project power and deter adversaries.
Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is built around short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), used against US bases, Iraq, and Gulf states, and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of reaching Israel from Iranian territory.
The arsenal includes both liquid- and solid-fuel variants. Alongside ballistic missiles, Tehran fields thousands of drones, including one-way attack, armed, and reconnaissance UAVs, as well as land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles.
It is unclear how many missiles Iran has. Some estimates put the number at more than 3,000 ballistic missiles of various types. It is even less clear how many remain after the war with the US and Israel.
In May, The New York Times reported that a classified US intelligence assessment found Iran still had about 70% of its mobile launchers operational across the country and had retained roughly 70% of its prewar missile stockpile.
Jim Lamson, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and visiting research fellow at King’s College London, told TNA that intelligence estimates of Iran’s missile stockpile are plausible, but difficult to confirm with confidence.
“Israeli and US strikes severely damaged Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure, hitting production sites, supply chains and operational bases,” he said.
While the strikes destroyed much of the above-ground infrastructure, Iran’s missile facilities inside tunnels were harder to target.
Lamson said he expects “Iran to try to rebuild and improve its ballistic missile capabilities moving forward,” particularly as reports indicate Tehran has already begun restoring parts of its missile network. A new deterrence doctrine While Iran has emerged from the war with significant leverage and a more assertive posture , using both diplomatic and military pressure to strengthen its negotiating position, the wars in 2025 and 2026 have exposed the limits of Tehran’s traditional deterrence strategy.
Its reliance on missile capabilities and proxy networks failed to prevent attacks on Iranian territory, prompting a reassessment of how it protects itself.
"I think Iran is now rethinking its defence doctrine,” Vaez said. “Tehran has discovered a new deterrent in its control over the Strait of Hormuz, though the question is whether it risks losing that leverage by overusing it.”
Eyre said that even if the US were to put the missile programme on the table, Iran would not make concessions. "It's going to be hard enough to get a nuclear deal, so the idea that Iran would negotiate its missile programme is just not realistic,” he added.
Those most concerned about the absence of Iran’s missile programme from the negotiations are in the Gulf.
Iran’s retaliation against the Gulf following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February has destabilised the region and undermined the sense of security the Gulf has projected for years.
Iran has launched hundreds to thousands of missiles and drones, hitting US bases and other military, energy, and civilian targets across the Gulf. Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) carried out covert retaliatory attacks inside Iran during the wider conflict.
Gulf concerns over Iran’s missile capabilities resurfaced last week after a joint US-GCC statement following Rubio’s visits to the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain. GCC foreign ministers said regional security required addressing Iran’s missiles, drones, and support for proxies, while reaffirming the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and rejecting any tolls, fees, or attempts to control the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran condemned the statement as “interventionist, irresponsible and provocative”, saying it distorted regional realities and echoed US and Israeli positions.
“Iranian missiles pose an actual and potential threat to the Gulf countries,” Lamson said. "If the conflict resumes, Iran could inflict even greater damage on financial, energy and other critical infrastructure. Its threat to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz will remain a key source of leverage and deterrence, with its missile and drone capabilities operationalising that threat."
At most, Iran's missile programme might potentially feature in talks with its neighbours as part of a new regional security dialogue.
Vaez argues that the MoU reflected pressure from mediators including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Egypt, which have concluded that "neither the US containment strategy towards Iran nor its security umbrella has brought them the kind of security they had in mind," requiring a new regional approach that includes Iran.
"I think the history of the past four decades, and especially the past year, has demonstrated that moderating Iran's behaviour through engagement is a much better way than containment and confrontation,” he said.
Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said last week that dialogue with Iran remains essential for regional stability, adding that Doha hopes for a new regional security framework.
But security in the Middle East remains out of reach. The ceasefire continues to wobble, while the separate Israel-Lebanon framework agreement tied to Hezbollah’s disarmament fuels domestic and regional tensions.
The Iran-backed group has rejected any disarmament linked to an Israeli withdrawal and continues to rely on Tehran’s leverage in its negotiations with the US, deepening uncertainty across the region. Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights Follow him on X: @DarioSabaghi Edited by Charlie Hoyle