Few Palestinians have crossed the King Hussein Bridge without returning with a story of long waits, delays, hardship—and, at times, even exploitation. Over the years, the bridge has ceased to be merely a border crossing connecting Palestinians with the outside world; it has become a symbol of the daily struggles endured by thousands of travelers. Endless hours of waiting, chronic congestion, complicated procedures, and recurring disorder have turned the journey itself into a psychological, economic, and humanitarian burden. Perhaps what makes this suffering even more painful is that it is no longer viewed as an exceptional experience, but rather as an accepted part of everyday travel for many Palestinians.
Against this backdrop, the Jordanian Ministry of Interior recently decided to prohibit 468 individuals from traveling through the King Hussein Bridge, effective June 30, 2026, after determining that they had repeatedly traveled to Jordan for commercial purposes, primarily to profit from the price differences in cigarettes and shisha tobacco sold at duty-free shops.
The decision sparked widespread debate among Palestinians. While public attention focused on those engaged in this activity, a far more important question received much less attention: Is the real problem the individuals themselves, or the economic and administrative policies that pushed them toward this activity in the first place?
To properly understand this phenomenon, we should not ask, "How can we prevent these people from traveling?" Instead, we should ask, "Why has this activity become a source of income for hundreds of Palestinian families?" Can this phenomenon really be understood in isolation from the severe economic crisis facing Palestinians—one shaped by stringent Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian economy, the loss of employment opportunities for tens of thousands of workers, rising unemployment, declining household incomes, and shrinking economic prospects?
Economic theory offers a straightforward explanation. Informal markets and parallel trade do not emerge spontaneously; they arise when economic incentives make the expected returns outweigh the risks involved. An economist therefore begins not by judging individuals' behavior, but by examining the economic environment that produces such behavior.
This is precisely the case in Palestine.
On one hand, thousands of Palestinians have lost their livelihoods due to Israeli restrictions preventing many Palestinian workers from accessing jobs inside Israel. The resulting surge in unemployment has forced numerous families to seek alternative sources of income simply to survive.
On the other hand, there is a substantial price gap between cigarettes and shisha tobacco sold in Jordanian duty-free shops and those available in the Palestinian market, largely due to high taxes and customs duties. When unemployment is combined with such significant price differentials, it is hardly surprising that some individuals attempt to capitalize on this gap by purchasing these products in Jordan and reselling them in Palestine.
What we are witnessing, therefore, is not merely smuggling or isolated commercial activity. It is an economic response to severe economic hardship. People do not create economic incentives—they respond to them.
For this reason, tightening border controls or restricting repeated travel may reduce the phenomenon temporarily, but it cannot eliminate its underlying causes. As long as unemployment remains high, substantial price disparities persist, and economic incentives continue to exist, market participants will inevitably seek alternative ways to generate income.
One policy option worthy of consideration is a review of the tax policy applied to cigarettes and shisha tobacco. This is not about encouraging smoking—protecting public health must remain a priority—but rather about adopting a more balanced tax policy that narrows the price gap with neighboring markets, reduces incentives for informal trade, and simultaneously eases the financial burden on Palestinian consumers facing one of the most difficult economic crises in recent history.
Successful tax policy is not measured solely by maximizing government revenue. It should strike a balance between public health objectives, fiscal sustainability, combating smuggling, and acknowledging the difficult economic realities faced by ordinary citizens.
From another perspective, I continue to believe that excluding Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market is unlikely to be a sustainable long-term solution. Despite Israel's increasing reliance on foreign workers, demographic, social, and security considerations make such dependence difficult to sustain indefinitely. The eventual return of Palestinian workers to their jobs would strengthen household incomes and naturally reduce reliance on temporary economic activities such as cigarette trading, since people inherently prefer stable employment over uncertain and risky sources of income.
However, the issue extends well beyond cigarette trading. It is fundamentally about the management of the crossing itself.
For many Palestinians, crossing the King Hussein Bridge has become synonymous with lengthy delays, overcrowding, and administrative complexity. As the primary land gateway connecting Palestinians to the outside world, the bridge has evolved into a daily source of frustration and hardship. Public opinion data collected by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) reinforces this assessment. According to the survey, 76.6% of Palestinians attribute congestion at the bridge primarily to political and security factors, while only 19.1% believe poor coordination among the relevant authorities is the main cause. This suggests that the Palestinian public does not view travelers or traders as the root of the problem but rather associates the crisis with broader political and administrative constraints governing the crossing.
The findings further reveal that 83% believe congestion severely restricts freedom of movement and exacerbates humanitarian suffering, while 94% support operating the crossing 24 hours a day as one of the most effective solutions. Moreover, 47% believe the crossing fails to meet travelers' needs, 53.5% consider the VIP system unfair, and 52.1% believe it contributes to additional congestion. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the current crisis extends far beyond repeated travel or cigarette trading.
In my view, the crisis has two distinct dimensions.
The first concerns administrative and organizational procedures. These require comprehensive review, modernization of operational mechanisms, and improved coordination among all relevant authorities to facilitate passenger movement and improve service quality. Encouragingly, Jordanian authorities, under the leadership of Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya, have recently initiated measures aimed at improving border management, regulating JET ticket sales, and addressing practices that contribute to congestion. These efforts deserve recognition, and one hopes they will produce tangible improvements in the near future.
The second—and arguably more significant—dimension concerns the bridge's limited operating hours. While most international border crossings operate around the clock, the King Hussein Bridge continues to function under restricted schedules, closing relatively early each day. This significantly limits its processing capacity, resulting in long queues and extended waiting times, particularly during peak travel seasons. As Jordanian officials themselves have noted, the daily number of departing passengers remains constrained by limits imposed by the Israeli side, underscoring that resolving this crisis requires genuine cooperation among all parties involved.
Improving border management, extending operating hours whenever possible, expanding the crossing's capacity, and upgrading passenger services are therefore just as important as any regulatory measures aimed at limiting repeated travel.
I remain convinced that this crisis is solvable—provided there is genuine political will among all stakeholders. Palestinians are not seeking special privileges or attempting to circumvent regulations. They seek a crossing that functions efficiently, smoother travel procedures, and above all, dignified employment that allows them to support their families without having to resort to temporary or informal sources of income.
Economics teaches us that people respond to incentives. Consequently, lasting solutions lie not in pursuing individuals or merely addressing the symptoms, but in removing the structural conditions that created these incentives in the first place. When decent employment opportunities become available, tax policies are better balanced, and border crossings are managed more efficiently, many of the phenomena we struggle with today will naturally diminish.
The problem is not the trader; it is the economic and administrative environment that produced him.
Therefore, the real question is not "How do we stop people from traveling or trading?" Rather, it is "How do we address the economic and policy failures that made these activities necessary in the first place?"
When we tackle the causes, the symptoms will gradually disappear. This is not only a fundamental principle of economics—it is also the shortest path toward more efficient border crossings, a stronger economy, and a more dignified life for the Palestinian people. Dr. Nabil Kukali is the Founder and President of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO). A specialist in public opinion research and socio-economic studies, he has more than three decades of experience designing and implementing survey research and field studies across Palestine and the Middle East.