As the only recent comprehensive analysis of the political situation in the Puntland State of Somalia, the International Crisis Group's (I.C.G.) August 12 "Policy Briefing," "Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland," is likely to be more influential on the perspectives of Western actors than it would be were it not the only game in town. That is unfortunate, because the briefing is deeply flawed methodologically.
The briefing has been widely enough disseminated and sufficiently critiqued, in terms of its factual errors, misinterpretations following from those errors, and bias in favor of particular interests, by Somali intellectuals, that no effort will be expended here to summarize the briefing or to pick it apart any further. Instead, the purpose of the present analysis is to diagnose the failings of the briefing in terms of the criteria of sound political analysis. A methodological critique reveals that the briefing is simply bad political science.
The present analysis will proceed in two steps. First, the methodological faults of the briefing will be addressed. Second, two recent developments in Puntland's political situation will be analyzed to show what a more disciplined methodology discloses.
Methodological Faults
The briefing, which argues that Puntland's political system has entered a cycle of fragmentation that, if not arrested, might end in "the violent break-up of Puntland, as rival clans seeking autonomy from Garowe carve out their own enclaves," paints a picture that had genuine plausibility in the last months of former president Adde Muse's administration in 2008, before the peaceful transfer of power to the new president, Abdirahman Muhammad Farole, in early 2009, which was facilitated by the clan elders. Since then, the political picture in Puntland has changed, rendering the I.C.G.'s briefing out of date. It is as though, having completed their research before the transition, the I.C.G. decided to stick with its interpretation and turn a blind eye to later developments.
Not being up-to-date vitiates one of the purposes of political analysis, which is to provide a current reading of a developing situation. Of what use is a briefing that describes and projects from a situation that no longer exists?
That the Puntland of Farole is not Adde Muse's Puntland will be indicated later when two recent developments are considered. For now, suffice it to say that the briefing does not address what Farole has done since assuming office, not even to dismiss it.
Having sounded the alarm bell, the I.C.G.'s briefing proceeds to deliver to Farole a laundry list of major structural constitutional and political reforms that it argues must be undertaken to save Puntland. The methodological flaw here runs even deeper; it is not a matter of the substance of the proposed reforms, but of the lack of any consideration of Farole and his administration as actors with their own perceived interests, quantum of resources, and strategies for applying resources to achieving interests. The I.C.G. tells Farole what to do without even considering what he believes he is trying to do and why.
By failing to honor the most fundamental principle of political analysis - know each actor in terms of its own interests, power, and strategy - the I.C.G.'s dicta hang in the air without any connection to the ground. Apparently, caught in the idea that desperate times call for desperate measures, the I.C.G. does not consider whether its requirements are at all realistic in reference to Farole's actual political situation. That oversight eventuates in a deep and destructive tension in the report: If the situation in Puntland is so fragmented, if clans are at such cross purposes, and if trust is so meager, then where would Farole find the necessary support to undertake major reforms?
Out of date and out of touch, the I.C.G.'s briefing was gathering dust before it was released.
Recent Developments
When one looks at Puntland from Farole's position, one must first understand that Farole is aware that he inherited a nest of nearly intractable problems from the previous administration, including an entrenched criminal industry, a legacy of corruption and self-dealing, and a measure of clan resentment that the I.C.G. emphasizes. He also knows that his election was achieved by a complex process of bargaining that hedges him between various consituencies that he must at least mollify. He can only move so far and so fast without upsetting the balance.
Within his restricted field of maneuver, Farole sees Puntland's vital interests as keeping the state intact as a political community and preserving its self-governing status in Somalia. In order to achieve these two aims most effectively, Farole also desires foreign aid for economic and social development, and for strengthening the security sector. Finally, Farole must attempt to satisfy donors that he is taking steps to serve their interests - most notably, curbing piracy. Those are Farole's perceived interests for Puntland - his agenda. He did not need the I.C.G. to warn him about Puntland's problems and he has his own ways of addressing them that do not involve massive structural reform - he is a pragmatist, not a visionary, and he prevailed in the transition by virtue of his centrism.
Two developments over the month from mid-August to mid-September show how Farole is pursuing the vital interests that he perceives for Puntland - keeping the regional state intact and preserving its provisional autonomy within Somalia.
The first major challenge to Farole's ability to manage domestic conflict and insecurity came on August 5, when Puntland's information minister, Warsame Abdi Sefta Bananka, was assassinated in the town of Galkayo, a major trading and transport hub that is split between a northern section governed by Puntland, and a southern section governed by the autonomous Galmudug authority. Through the summer, political instability had been rising in Galkayo, with assassinations, political infighting, clan conflicts, tensions between the north and south, and apprehensions that the civil war in southern and central Somalia would spill over into Puntland through the town.
Sefta's assassination posed a threat to the strength and credibility of Farole and his administration, and represented a surfacing of the kinds of divisions of which the I.C.G. had warned, forcing Farole to respond. Almost immediately, Farole moved his presidency to Galkayo, and remained there with other high-ranking Puntland officials until mid-September, taking a hands-on approach and assuming responsibility.
Having taken his high-profile initiative, Farole and his delegation entered into protracted negotiations with businessmen, elders, scholars and politicians to find a formula for stability. Pressure to reach a resolution mounted when, on August 12, five foreign preachers of the Tabliq missionary group were executed at a mosque on the Puntland side of Galkayo. Farole was quick to blame Galmudug for the crime and Galmudug was quick to blame Puntland. Farole removed the governor of the Puntland portion of the Mudug region, of which Galkayo is the capital.
After a tense two weeks following the executions, Farole and Puntland's vice president, Gen. Abdisamad Ali Shire, vowed to remain in Galkayo until a new and "representative" district council was elected there. On August 28, the town's district council elected a businessman and political newcomer, Abidrahman Mohamoud Haji Hasan, to the post of mayor in a 22-9 vote over ex-mayor Ahmad Ali Salad. The reformulated administration also included the new position of district council chairman, providing a check on the mayor's power. Farole promised that he would appoint a new governor, security committee and police comander for the Mudug region.
On August 31, women's groups and some clan leaders held a demonstration protesting Hasan's election and claiming that he was an "Islamist hardliner." Hasan responded that he was aware that the security situation in Galkayo was "imperfect," and called upon women's groups to "work for peace and stability." Voice of Mudug radio quoted elder Ali Ka'an as saying that the election of Hasan was a "coup against democracy." Hasan accused Voice of Mudug of "exaggerating the situation." Since then, open-source monitoring has yielded no further reports of post-election backlash. On September 4, Farole named Ahmed Ali Salad, the losing candidate in the mayoral election, as governor of Mudug, along with a new police commander.
The purpose of the foregoing account was not to show that Farole was good or evil, right or wrong, or successful or unsuccessful in restoring Galkayo's stability; but to show that, when faced with a crisis, he took immediate responsibility, moved to the center of the conflict, and was instrumental in negotiating a settlement based on consultation. One of the major points of the I.C.G.'s briefing is that the Puntland political class has abandoned traditional methods of consultative conflict resolution. That was certainly not the case in Galkayo, where Frarole attempted to balance local interests in a pragmatic fashion. Although he beefed up security forces in the town and the local security committee declared a state of emergency and a curfew, the situation was at least temporarily resolved by bargaining. Most importantly, Farole did not seek to insulate himself from the crisis and to let it fester, nor did he impose a solution by main force - he took a fully engaged middle way and did not seek cover by relying on proxies.
While he was in Galkayo attempting to ease political tensions there, Farole moved to pursue the second of his vital interests for Puntland - securing its autonomy as a self-governing state in Somalia, pending a national political reconstitution based on a federal system of government that would maximize Puntland's self-rule.
Farole's bid for Puntland's autonomy came as a result of the crisis in Somalia's internationally recognized bit ineffective Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which had lost control of southern and central Somalia to an armed Islamic opposition, and was under pressure from Western donors to reach out to as many interests in Somalia as it possibly could. Farole had distanced himself from the T.F.G. due to the latter's commitment to a more centralist political formula, but he was ready to deal when the opportunity arose.
On August 8, the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, paid his first official visit to Puntland, where he met for two weeks with Farole to negotiate an agreement on Puntland's relations with the T.F.G. and its status in Somalia. On August 23, the two leaders signed a fifteen-point accord that fulfilled Farole's essential aims and gave little, if anything, to the T.F.G.
Most importantly, the Galkayo agreement affirmed the T.F.G.'s recognition of Puntland as "a stable and self-governing part of Somalia," and, indeed, as a "model for the Federal system in Somalia;" and committed the T.F.G. to forming "more autonomous states in Somalia," and encouraging "the only existing State in Somalia, which is Puntland." In addition to the T.F.G. signing on to Farole's conception of federalism, the accord stated that the commision for finalizing a permanent constitution for Somalia would be based in Puntland's capital Garowe; that Puntland would be "allowed to participate as an administration in all meetings regarding the State's interests;" and that the command of anti-piracy forces would be established in Puntland.
The Galkayo agreement represented a symbolic victory for Farole rather than a practical gain. Not only is it ineffective and embattled; the T.F.G. is also severely divided. Indeed, the agreement has already begun to unravel, with factions in the T.F.G. opposed to it reportedly moving to unseat Sharmarke. On September 13, the T.F.G.'s deputy prime minister and fisheries minister, Abdirahman Ibbi, and Djibouti's transport minister, Ali Hasan Bahdon, signed an agreement to establish an anti-piracy training center in Djibouti in return for Djibouti's promised military aid to the T.F.G. Ibbi remarked that Djibouti's president, Ismail Omar Guelleh had requested the provision on the training center in meetings with the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad. The Farole administration predictably saw the Djibouti agreement as a violation of the provision of the Galkayo accord that specifies Puntland as the site of the anti-piracy command. It did not help that Ibbi told Somaliweyn Media that putting the anit-piracy command in Puntland would be like trusting "a hyena to take goats to the grazing field."
To repeat, the point here is not to argue that Farole gained a practical success with the Galkayo agreement; the T.F.G. is too weak and divided to be a genuine negotiating partner - rather, he succeeded in gaining recognition of his position on Somalia's future political formula. That recognition can be used as a marker by Puntland if and when a constitutional process for Somalia gets underway.
As fpr the anti-piracy center, Farole would like to get closer to the donors, who would pay for the base, but he knows that Djibouti is fast becoming a dependency of the donors and has abandoned its traditional neutrality and role as a presumptive honest broker (France and the United States have military bases there , and Djibouti hosted the conference in which Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmed became president of the T.F.G., has promised troops to support the T.F.G., and is providing training facilities for T.F.G. security forces). Djibouti expects pay-back for doing the donors' bidding. It remains to be seen which faction of the T.F.G. wins out in the battle over the location of the base, and whether Sharmarke, who comes from Puntland, will be able to hold his post as prime minister in the ongoing power struggle. As analyst Liban Ahmad points out, the T.F.G. would suffer a further loss if Puntland becomes disaffected.
The Galkayo agreement is also an indication that another of the I.C.G.'s judgments - that secessionist tendencies are growing in Puntland's political class - should at least be put in question. If there are such tendencies, Farole's move is an effort to blunt them.
Conclusion
The I.C.G. concludes its briefing with the following judgment: "To halt the precipitous decline in security and political stability, Puntland must improve governance and re-establish the intra-clan cohesion it enjoyed at its inception. Recent moves by the Farole government are not encouraging."
Without going into the details of Farole's efforts to bolster security and achieve stability, which are abundant, one would be hard pressed to find evidence of a continued "precipitous decline" in Puntland during the first nine months of his administration; indeed, there is no evidence to that effect. If that is so, it is neither here nor there whether Farole has made "encouraging" moves from the viewpoint of the I.C.G.'s structural-reform agenda, since the crisis/problem that it is meant to address does not exist.
Farole's victory in a peacful transition of power was already evidence that Puntland's political community had arrested the cycle of fragmentation that had become acute before the bargaining process that made the transition possible. It is not Farole who arrested the cycle, but the very political class that the I.C.G. indicts. After the election, Farole moved to incorporate his rivals into his administration, achieving sufficient success to form a governing coalition that has held together.
As the leader of a coalition, Farole needs to be a consensus builder, rather than a radical reformer, in order to achieve the aims of holding Puntland together and preserving its autonomous status. Confronted by instability (to say the least) to the south, and now to the west in Somaliland, his first task is to insulate Puntland from surrounding conflicts that might upset the domestic balance of interests. That in itself is a tall order.
The I.C.G. report paints a drastic picture of fragmentation and then expects Farole to act boldly to change Puntland's political system - this is an example of policy pushing that has run off the rails and into a field of fantasy.
The yawning chasm between the I.C.G.'s definition of Puntland's situation and its policy recommendations can be bridged by attending to Farole's perception of Puntland's interests and his strategy for achieving them. From that viewpoint, the situation is fraught with difficulties and dangers, but not so dire as to demand a desperate stab in the darkness of structural reform.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University