Washington's U-turn on Tehran

In diplomacy, you sometimes need to make a 180-degree turn from vigorously held positions. When you do so, the trick is to pretend no such thing is happening. This seems to be what's going on in Washington right now as the Bush administration is trying to explain its policy reversal on Iran. Yet it should not be so difficult for American officials to justify their decision. After all, if America ever needed a face-saving excuse to talk to Iran, it already had one earlier this year. It was not long ago that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced a report indicating that Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003. The NIE report was a major blow for hawks within the Bush administration and a godsend for the pro-engagement camp. It may be useful for Turkish readers to get a clearer sense of who are the hawks and doves in Washington vis-à-vis Iran policy. The pro-engagement camp's main players are Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who recently visited Ankara, ostensibly to send a clearer message to Tehran via Turkish diplomats. The hawks are headed by the usual suspects: Vice President Dick Cheney and his group of neoconservative friends. Needless to say, their numbers within the administration have seriously diminished since the 2006 midterm electoral defeat.

The pro-engagement camp's latest victory came last week with the decision to send Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to Geneva to join talks between European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili. The Burns sit-down with this group was the first time America had fielded so senior an official for direct talks with Iran on nuclear matters The Bush administration had previously ruled out joining the nuclear talks until Iran suspended uranium enrichment, so sending an envoy to Geneva was a big turnaround. Iran's fiery president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, says the uranium work will go on. But if all goes well, Washington may even be sending a couple of diplomats back to Tehran after an absence of 30 years.

The obvious question in everyone's mind is timing. Why is America engaging Iran so directly right now? The answers are many. But perhaps the most obvious is that America has no better option. The law of unintended consequences is something that future American presidents will have to keep in mind next time they wage war in the Middle East. One of the most unintended results of America's invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan has been the emergence of Iran as a much stronger regional power in the Middle East. After all, Saddam Hussein was a bitter enemy of the Shiite regime in Iran. His historic role in the region was to balance the Islamic revolution's regional aspirations. This is why the "West" came to his assistance during the 1980-1988 war. In that sense, keeping Baghdad under Sunni rule was also crucial for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. In other words, the Sunni autocrats who were concerned about political Islam and Shiite power considered Saddam the lesser evil when weighed against Iran. This is probably why they all asked Washington to tread very carefully before invading Iraq. The last thing they wanted to see was Iraq turn into a Shiite-dominated state.

Well, this is exactly what happened. Today's Iraq is not only Shiite-dominated, but it is also dominated by Shiites who were in exile in Iran for decades. Not surprisingly, they have a sense of gratitude and loyalty to Tehran. And I'm sure Tehran also has a sense of gratitude to Washington for having handed Iraq to the Shiite majority. There must be similar feelings of appreciation for Washington in Tehran concerning Afghanistan. The Taliban, after all, were Sunni fundamentalists who hated the Shiite regime in Iran. By destroying them, the United States did Iran a favor. In short, between 2002 and 2004, just two years, Washington annihilated Tehran's two worst enemies.

The result? A Shiite crescent has emerged in the Middle East and Iran has become the regional hegemonic force. Iraq, for the first time since the 12th century, is a Shiite state and the best ally of Iran in the Middle East. The Shiite minorities of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Bahrain (majority) all feel emboldened. And Iran sits at the heart of this Shiite crescent developing a nuclear capability. Add to this list, the unprecedented high in oil prices and you get the overall picture for Washington. Under such circumstances it is no wonder that Tehran has now the upper hand and wants to capitalize its gains by negotiating from a position of strength. No wonder Persians invented the game of chess. Washington could use a lesson or two.

ÖMER TAŞPINAR