How Moscow courts the Muslim world

Vladimir Putin was the first head of a non-Muslim majority state to speak at the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a gathering of 57 Muslim states, in October 2003. That was a political and diplomatic feat, especially since Russia was waging a long-running war in Chechnya at the time. Putin stressed that 15 percent of the population of the Russian Federation is Muslim and that all the inhabitants of eight of its 21 autonomous republics are Muslim, and he won observer member status with the organization, thanks to support from Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Since then, Putin and other Russian leaders, including the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, claim that Russia "is, to some extent, a part of the Muslim world." In an interview with Al Jazeera on Oct. 16, 2003, Putin stressed that, unlike Muslims living in Western Europe, those in Russia were indigenous, and that Islam had been present on Russian territory long before Christianity. So Russia now claims to have a privileged political relationship with the Arab and Muslim world and believes that, as a mostly European state, it has a historic vocation as a mediator between the Western and Muslim worlds.

There are reasons for these claims. The first is to counter the pernicious effect of the war in Chechnya, in Russia as much as in the rest of the world. The aim is to avoid, or at least limit, polarization between Russia's ethnic majority and its Muslims by reinforcing Muslims' feelings of belonging to the state. "We must prevent Islamophobia," said Putin in the Al Jazeera interview. That will be difficult, given the way anyone suspected of being a Muslim fundamentalist is pursued, and not just in Chechnya. "Terrorism should not be identified with any one religion, culture or tradition," Putin insisted. Before 9/11 he called Chechen rebels "Muslim fundamentalist terrorists." Now he speaks of "terrorists connected to international criminal networks and drug and arms traffickers," avoiding any reference to Islam.

The other purpose in seeking special ties with the Arab and Muslim world is related to Russia's foreign policy aim to "reinforce multipolarity in the world" - to sustain and develop poles of resistance to U.S. hegemony and unilateralism. This means taking advantage of the hostility to U.S. foreign policy in the Arab and Muslim world. The Soviet Union used to present itself as the natural ally of anti-imperialist Arab states "with a socialist orientation." Now Russia is seeking strong political relations not only with Iran and Syria, but also with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, which have long been close American allies.

Economic considerations are important, especially in the energy sector - the power behind Russia's return to the international stage. The Kremlin believes there is a major future in nuclear energy and the export of nuclear power stations, which may give Russia a competitive edge in technology and make it more than just an exporter of raw energy. The same is true of high-tech weapons, which were the most successful economic sector of the former Soviet Union before serious difficulties in the 1990s.

The Kremlin is no longer seeking formal alliances. It wants strong but non-restrictive political ties in frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), which do not put it in direct opposition to the United States. Significantly, Iran only has observer status in this organization, although it would like to be a full member.

One more explanation for this new policy toward the Muslim world is the quest for a post-Soviet Russian identity at home and abroad. This is not just political opportunism. In 2005, the academic Sergei Rogov wrote in the official Foreign Ministry review: "The Islamic factor in Russian policy is first and foremost a question of identity. ... That is one of the reasons why Russia cannot yet be a nation state in the European sense of the term. ... Our relations with the Islamic world directly affect our security."

It is important to grasp what that means. In September 2003, Igor Ivanov, then foreign minister, said the war in Iraq had increased the number of terrorist attacks on Russian territory as elsewhere in the world. That was before Beslan, but Russia was already fearful of terrorism as a consequence of the Iraq war. Russia had hoped that a new multipolar configuration would emerge from the concerted opposition at the UN Security Council by France, Germany and Russia, which had deprived the U.S. of international legitimacy for the war.

Russian leaders were seriously concerned that a "clash of civilizations" would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and unconditional U.S. support for Israel's most intransigent policies, Russian leaders thought potential U.S. attacks on Iran would be a catastrophe, with destabilizing consequences in Iran, so close to Russia, as well as in several former Soviet republics and in Russia.

By Jacques Lévesque