In the 16th century, Iran under Safavid rule and Turkey under the Ottomans were rising rival empires in a difficult neighborhood. Their conflicts and rivalry revolved mainly around Iraq and the Caucasus. Today, after a long pause, the situation is not altogether different.
After World War I, the territories that caused the friction and conflict between Turkey and Iran were totally lost by the two states, and the geopolitics of the region changed. Relations between Iran, Turkey, and Iraq were shaped by three realities: Pro-Western governments ruled the three countries, the Soviet Union presented a common external threat (in 1955, the three joined the Baghdad Pact under the umbrella of the United States and the United Kingdom), and Kurdish insurgencies and armed political movements presented a common potential internal or trans-regional threat.
Indeed, the "Kurdish question" has dominated the foreign policies of Iran, Iraq and Turkey since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. It was a potential source of conflict between Turkey and Iran during the 1920s, when the Turkish Army crushed the Kurdish revolts in Turkey and resurgent Kurds fled into Iran. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan (the latter the only state that does not have a significant Kurdish population) established the Sadabad Pact in 1937 in order to secure their borders and prevent subversive (read Kurdish) activities within their territories.
Iran, Iraq and Turkey generally adhered to the Sadabad Pact for a long time. They resisted the temptation to use the "Kurdish card" against one another's interests. However, following the 1958 military coup in Iraq, Iran confronted a state capable of challenging its ambitions to wield hegemonic power in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. The Iranian-Iraqi geostrategic rivalry was accompanied by a nationalist and ideological clash and long-term border demarcation disputes.
The Kurdish card became an attractive political and military weapon for Iran in its conflicts with Iraq. Turkey apprehensively watched as Iran and Iraq exploited the Kurds for political leverage against each other. Ankara was concerned about a possible refugee flow due to the Iraqi regime's harsh response against the Iraqi Kurds and the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity next to its borders.
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 fundamentally reversed Iran's policy orientation, as revolutionary ideology began to shape its politics. Pursuing an independent foreign policy that included "anti-imperialist" discourse meant that one of the pillars of the Iran-Turkey relationship (pro-Western policies) was terminated. Still, Turkey quickly recognized the revolutionary regime in Iran because it was worried about the consequences of a possible breakup of the country and its falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980 helped Turkey in two ways. First, it prevented a political confrontation with Iran; second, both Iraq and Iran provided Turkey with profitable markets by acquiring vital goods there. Indeed, in the mid-1980s Turkey's trade volume with Iran and Iraq exceeded $2 billion dollars annually. Nevertheless, a power vacuum emerged in the north of Iraq after the mid-1980s, as Iraq lost its authority in Kurdistan due to the ongoing war and the Kurdish uprising. Turkey, concerned about a possible attack on Kirkuk by Kurdish groups supported by Iran, announced that it would view any attack on the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline as being directed against Turkish interests.
Another Turkish concern was that a possible Iranian victory would cause the disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. On the other hand, Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq in late 1986 to destroy the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or the PKK, camps there upset Tehran. Iranian leaders were concerned lest Ankara alter the regional power balance to their detriment if Turkey controlled northern Iraq and the oil region of Mosul-Kirkuk.
The PKK was established in the late 1970s to promote Kurdish nationalism. It invoked terrorist actions and armed struggle from the late 1980s. The de facto fragmentation of Iraq after the first Gulf war in 1991 gave momentum to Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Due to a power vacuum in northern Iraq, the PKK was able to establish itself in the area. In the early 1990s, clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK intensified.
By that time significant internal and external developments were affecting Iranian-Turkish relations. Turkey confronted the rise of radical "political" Islam, the emergence of a Kurdish separatist movement and the debate it engendered on the Kurdish question, political instability, and a severe economic crisis. Meanwhile, in Iran two developments profoundly affected both foreign and domestic policies from the late 1980s: the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1989. Thereafter, throughout the 1990s, Iran's revolutionary policies gradually eroded.
The geopolitics of the Middle East and the surrounding region changed drastically because of two major events in 1991: the dissolution of the USSR and the first Gulf war. This, too, profoundly affected Turkish-Iranian relations. With the collapse of the USSR, a common threat to Iran and Turkey disappeared, and with it the centripetal force linking the two countries.
The first Gulf war affected Turkish-Iranian relations in two ways. First, the US began to pursue its "dual containment policy" against both Iraq and Iran. Intended to isolate the two states internationally, the policy posed a huge obstacle to any improvement in Turkish-Iranian relations. Second, an aftermath of the Gulf war was the creation of safe havens for the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. This was perceived by both Turkey and Iran as a threat (lest the havens evolve into a Kurdish state), but also an opportunity to exert their influence. The power vacuum, ambiguity and struggle for influence in the north of Iraq led to Turkish incursions against the PKK in 1995 and 1997, and confrontation between Turkey and Iran as they took opposite sides in the struggle between the two Iraqi Kurdish parties.
Thus, after almost 70 years, geopolitical changes in the region have caused the reappearance of Turkish-Iranian competition over the Caucasus and Iraq. However, though Turkey and Iran have very different postures regarding the US-led war against Saddam Hussein and the heavy presence of American forces in Iraq, they realize that direct intervention and competition over the country will not be tolerated by Washington. Thus they are united in supporting the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity. Still, the competition between them in promoting their interests in Iraq, for example by supporting rival Iraqi factions, can on occasion be harmful.
Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.