Down the path of confrontation

By Ehsan Ahrari

As President George W Bush has renewed his confrontational rhetoric toward Iran and Syria during his State of the Union speech, four major questions loom over the horizon of the Middle East. Three of those questions are about Iraq's near-term future, and the fourth one is about Iran and Syria.

Thinking about Iraq's long-term future is a fruitless exercise at this point. Keeping that reality in mind, here are the three questions. First, what kind of government will come to power? Second, will that new government ask the US to leave? Third, is there any organized Sunni response to what is generally regarded as a government dominated by Shi'ites? The fourth question, and one which is uppermost in the international community, is whether Iran and Syria are likely to be targeted for the next round of confrontation?

The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), an alliance of Shi'ite political parties as well as independent Shi'ite candidates, claimed on Wednesday that its slate had won more than 50% of votes cast for the transitional National Assembly. At the same time, it declared that it would refrain from installing clerics in the new government. This was an important gesture of the UIA to reassure its Sunni counterparts - and Kurds - as well as secular Shi'ites that it would not use its electoral power to establish an Islamic government that resembles the one in neighboring Iran. The UIA's current position is based on its reading of what Shi'ite leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has been saying all along: he does not want to establish a theocracy in Iraq.

Unless the UIA's electoral claim is officially proved, all its gestures regarding the actual nature of the new government are not that significant. Even if it wins a majority of votes, it is still premature to postulate whether clerics will be part of the new cabinet, since the prime minister will select the cabinet with the assembly's approval. However, the UIA's attempt to soothe the fears of the Sunnis is quite thoughtful and is likely to be well received, at least by the Kurds, if the UIA indeed emerges as the dominant party.

But whether the new government will be Islamic or whether it will have strong or weak leanings toward Iran are variables that are not likely to surface convincingly in the near future. No one is more aware of that reality than the US, as its ability to control or even manage events in Iraq is becoming increasingly shaky. What also troubles Washington is that no Iraqi leader who wishes to be envisaged as legitimate by his countrymen would want to do anything that would create a strong image of his dependence or diffidence toward the US. His position toward Islam is also likely to become very much part and parcel of that litmus test of independence. That is one reason all future Shi'ite leaders are ritualistically reiterating Sistani's position toward the separation of religion and politics. Even the longevity of Sistani's preference regarding the separation of religion and politics in Iraq is questionable. No one should forget that powerful Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is still around and has very different ideas about the place of Islam in Iraq. In addition, no one knows how effective Iran will become in materializing its own preferences regarding the role of Islam in Iraq. All these variables will take time to play themselves out.

The continued presence of US forces in Iraq has already become a topic of major wrangling in the United States. Senator Ted Kennedy, a major critic of the invasion of Iraq, sent the ball rolling by urging the Bush administration to begin troop withdrawal. He said, "The elections in Iraq this weekend provide an opportunity for a fresh and honest approach. We need a new plan that sets fair and realistic goals for self-government in Iraq, and works with the Iraqi government on a specific timetable for the honorable homecoming of our forces." Bush rejected that suggestion; however, the issue of phased redeployment of US troops is not likely to fade away.

Examining the redeployment of US troops from the present ground realities in Iraq, it is very difficult to draw a clear-cut conclusion either way without getting overwhelmed about the consequences. Those who suggest that the US troops should get out of Iraq because they have become part of the problem related to heightened instability, may not be thinking about what other force would take its place. Troops wearing the UN helmet have not exactly established a record of serving as a credible force in Bosnia or Africa in the recent past. Only a military that would not hesitate from using force would be a credible one in Iraq; and no one but US troops fill that bill, and maybe British troops.

However, British troops have shown their effectiveness as a supplemental force, not as a force that would supplant the US military. The sad irony is that by invading Iraq, the US has made it a place where nothing but the presence of US troops will result in stabilization, but even so, that stabilization would be highly tenuous. No other country or group of countries would be effective. One cannot think of combined Arab forces, since it is not possible to use such forces to establish democracy in Iraq. How can those forces be used to institute democracy in Iraq when they themselves are coming from a highly anti-democratic environment? Thus the ultimate alternative becomes the continued presence of US forces. That means there is not likely to be an end to insurgency there.

There is little doubt that the Sunnis will oppose Shi'ite-dominated democracy in Iraq. The unknown variable is how far they will go in opposing it. Will they wage an all-out war against it by continuing to support the insurgents? Considering the already-palpable willingness of the Shi'ite groups to include Sunnis in the future governmental arrangement, there is high hope that cooler heads will prevail on the Sunni side. The wild card is the role of the insurgents. They will continue to wage an all-out war from Sunni areas, thereby making Iraq a place resembling hell.

Iran and Syria: Watching and waiting
Iran has been the focus of America's confrontational approach throughout the past year. Now Syria has also become a visible target. In the context of Bush's State of the Union speech, what seems to be bugging him is the role of these two countries in the region. Syria has not been too cooperative in terms of clamping down hard on trans-border insurgency in Iraq. In addition, it remains an occupying force of Lebanon, where Hezbollah, a group that Iran also actively supports, has continued to confront Israel.

Regarding Syria, Bush said, "To promote peace in the broader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder. Syria still allows its territory, and parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the region. You [US Congress] have passed, and we are applying, the Syrian Accountability Act - and we expect the Syrian government to end all support for terror and open the door to freedom." Regarding Iran, he said, "Today, Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror - pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve. We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment program and any plutonium reprocessing, and end its support for terror. And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you."

What is the meaning of this continued confrontational posture toward Iran and Syria? Apparently, the immediate purpose regarding Iran is the resolution of the nuclear issue, with the Damocles' sword of US preemptive action hanging over the heads of that country's rulers. Syria may be given a longer leash, with increased diplomatic pressure for its withdrawal from Lebanon in the coming months. The US expectation is that an unoccupied Lebanon might be able to control Hezbollah. At least for now, that appears to be a wrong conclusion.

The Bush administration's agenda for its second term, at least the way it was spelled out in the president's State of the Union speech, gives no reason for optimism for the Middle East. It appears that the US has not learned one major lesson from its ongoing Iraqi debacle: the lone superpower cannot impose democracy or stability from without and make it grow. Thus far, Iraq has been proving that point. If Washington is getting ready for more military adventurism in Iran and Syria, then the world has a lot to worry about: increased instability and turbulence in the Middle East for at least the next four years.

For the full text of the State of the Union address, click here.