Divided government homecoming, and the politics of cat and mouse

February 13, 2005

In this debate of establishing government back in Mogadishu, people seem to forget the tribal implication of unilateral disarmament of clan militias and the climate of fear over unfair advantage by any Somali clan in the troubled areas. One needs to keep in mind this, when you talk about this militia or that militia, you are talking about the armed wing of some sub-clan (no matter how disorganized and disorderly you find them to be or even their part-time deadly tendencies for survival and often outright greed). We hear rhetoric phrases from Somali politicians who are not the ones targeted to be immediately disarmed “We have to disarm the militias…you have to rehabilitate these career killers into the society...” The question is who has the right to disarm other clan’s militias while theirs is still armed? So, next time you hear about disarming militias, it is about whose sub-clan is being disarmed and who keeps their weapons. Armed people are not the main challenge in this crisis it is the politics of real power sharing and genuine accord that is absent in here. The last time armed power was in the hands of one group was the last Siad Barre regime and we all know what happened.

You listen to the agitated Hawiye leaders (specially the straight shooter, Yelexaw who is known for his painfully blunt and sometimes incredible tone of addressing issues) and their apprehensions of the idea of African peacekeepers to deliver and safeguard the newly assembled and rather large Somali government headed by Abdillahi Yusuf at its destiny bench in Mogadishu and you find both sides of the contention faintly reasonable, especially under the circumstance in which the factions have decided to build a government without serious reconciliation and true appeasement among the main rivals. It is a wearisome puzzle.

It is easy to paint the Mogadishu faction leaders such as Yelexaw as the bad guys in this quarrel but do not rush to judgment. No one is saint over there. Abdillahi Yusuf and company are also trying to gain extra advantage by having a loyal army that is more powerful then these local militias. Taking both sides of the squabble into considerations, I’m on the side of Mogadishu leaders on this for one reason and one reason only. I believe that Somalia needs a government that knows anytime they screw up, they will then be chased out of town by force. I take the following phrase from the American Declaration of Independence

“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness”.

The mistake those who oppose foreign troops are making in this game of cat and mouse with Abdillahi Yusuf and his allies is not pressing forward their debate and their concern in a more reasonable platform. Also, it is crucial for the Mogadishu leaders to come up with their set of programs and strategies for law and order to function. Yes, it costs staggeringly way more to bring African troops then to use locally organized forces of Somalis. Yes, the AIDS epidemic is a serious matter to bring into the equation when consider deploying forces that are 30-40% infected with that deadly virus. Let us look briefly into these issues.

The Excessive Cost: According to Strategy Page (a military news and affairs) It costs the UN $63,000 a year for each peacekeeper in Africa. Most of that money goes for transport, housing and support, with about a quarter of the cash going to the individual peacekeepers. You are looking at approximately $550,000,000 for about 7,500 troops to be in the Mogadishu area in one year alone. It is known that members of these so-called Somali militias make less then $100 per month from the businesses they protect or from warlords they serve. One can easily do the math. Most of these militia members have families. Most of them would serve beyond their call of duty for a fraction of what a foreign soldier would make in Mogadishu and all of them know their terrain and their people very well. Besides, the anticipated African forces especially from Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia are being used in the past for local civil wars in their countries and are susceptible to disorderly conduct. And they are not better disciplined then these Somali militias. Some of the troop donors have had something to do with the continued civil wars in the area and supported different factions in Somalia over the years.

The AIDS Concern: In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni told the African Development Forum (see Africa Recovery), the military has a strict policy of non-discrimination against HIV-positive soldiers, one of the highest infected percentage in the world. Himself a former guerrilla commander, who is widely credited for Uganda's success in halving the country's rate of new infections, stressed that infected personnel are kept in the military and assigned less strenuous duties until they become too ill to serve. Well, that says all.

Amid evidence that infection rates for the AIDS virus are soaring among African military and police personnel, African governments, the UN and the international community are taking a closer look at the link between the uniformed services and AIDS. A study of some Sub-Saharan Africa troops (Specially in Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria) returning from peacekeeping operations in West Africa and Rwanda, for example, conducted by a non-governmental agency, found infection rates more than double that of the country overall. Significantly, the study also found that a soldier's risk of infection doubled for each year spent on deployment in conflict regions -- suggesting a direct link between duty in the war zone and HIV transmission. Another study of Dutch soldiers on a 5-month peacekeeping mission in Cambodia found that 45 per cent had sexual contact with prostitutes or other members of the local population during their deployment. The limited data available is alarming.

Now, I do not need to puzzle you with statistically projected rate of HIV transmission by those estimated 33% of soldiers already infected and would be deployed to Mogadishu, or discuss in here about closed mathematical expression or subset of formula to indicate possible number of Somalis to be infected in certain period. In any case, the end result will not be pleasant one in my opinion.

ConclusionFor Somalis, it is almost becoming sick political culture to look outside for solutions. All sorts of solutions, economic support, political support, even tribal reconciliation, what a shame! It is time to take responsibility of local affairs no matter how difficult the challenges are. Some sense of belonging has to be established in this nation building. If you can’t build your own nation, you probably don’t need one. I could not agree more with Mr. Yelexow and his colleagues on this. He happens to be one of the few who believe it can be done among Somalis based on serious trust and forgiveness among the leaders. He may sound funny and at times unsophisticated, but he tells the truth and he deserves attention.

By: Abdirahman Waberi
Posted: 09th/February/2005