''China's Geostrategy: Playing a Waiting Game''

07 January 2005

It is common knowledge that China is the most important ascending world power, and one that has only begun to realize its economic and military potential. Before the World Trade Center bombings on September 11, 2001, neoconservative strategists in Washington identified China as the most significant future threat to U.S. interests and defined the Sino-American relation as one of "strategic competition" rather than "strategic partnership." Although the "war on terrorism" has taken precedence over the longer term conflict with China in Washington's geostrategy, the neoconservatives' pre-9/11 judgment was well founded and remains so.

The "ruling party" -- as the Communists in Beijing now call themselves -- sees China's ultimate interest as becoming the undisputed regional power center in East and Southeast Asia, and a major influence -- along with India -- in South Asia, and -- along with Russia -- in Central Asia. In order to achieve its goals, Beijing will have to edge Washington out of Asia by incorporating Taiwan and rendering Washington's security guarantees for Japan and South Korea less credible. Beijing's strategy puts Washington on the defensive with the expectation that, as time goes on, the balance of power will shift inexorably in Beijing's favor. That is why Washington's current National Security Strategy posits a window of opportunity of about a decade for the U.S. to achieve permanent strategic supremacy in the world.

At present, China is what historian John Gittings calls a "status-quo power that often punches below its weight in international politics." That is a realistic position for a power to take that expects its situation to improve over time, as it builds up its economy and military to full potential. For the moment, Beijing's interests are best served by adopting a "defensive" posture and a foreign policy geared to promoting stability. That is likely to change to a more assertive stance the more that China's power resources increase.

On December 27, 2004, Beijing issued a white paper, "China's National Defense in 2004," that declares and explains its national security strategy. Beijing attaches importance to the document, which, according to Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense Zhang Bangdong, is meant to make China's geostrategy transparent to the rest of the world and thereby foster trust and build confidence in China's peaceful intentions. Military attaches from 60 states attended a publicized briefing and question-and-answer session on the white paper.

As public statements of policy, white papers are instruments of policy as much as or more than they are explanations of it. They cannot be taken at face value, because they express what the issuing power wants other powers to believe about its intentions and capabilities. Yet, such documents are useful for analytic purposes, because it is often the case that it serves a power's interests to engender stable and reliable expectations in its allies and adversaries. White papers need to be read critically, in light of the past and current behaviors of the regimes that issue them. China's white paper on national defense presents a geostrategy that is consistent with the country's current behavior and that accords with its interests in its present period of development. If it is not taken as a statement of long-term policy, the white paper is a good indicator of Beijing's intentions.

Beijing's Assessment of World Politics

Despite the growth and proliferation of international and transnational political organizations, the basis and framework of world politics remain the configuration and distribution of power among states, each one applying a strategy to realize the interests perceived by its decision makers. At present, the configuration of world political power is confused, somewhere between a pattern of unipolar U.S. dominance and multipolarity, in which a number of regional powers with varying degrees of global reach and influence cooperate to keep the globalizing world economy stable, and compete for strategic advantage on the margins of their respective regions. It is impossible to predict confidently which of the two paradigms will become dominant, although in the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, a drift toward multipolarity has become discernible.

In a period in which the configuration of world power has a measure of indeterminacy, powers adopt and support paradigms as desired futures, based on perceived interests. Washington's National Security Strategy, for example, is conditioned by the goal of a unipolar configuration in which the U.S. is the arbiter of globalization by virtue of unchallengeable military power. In contrast, major regional powers -- China, the Franco-German combine, Russia, Brazil and India -- desire a multipolar world in which the U.S. is decentered and becomes a North American regional power with global reach. The regional powers adopt multipolarity because it gives each one of them advantages over the U.S. The great struggle of the first two decades of the 21st century will be over which of the two configurations gains ascendancy and how power will be distributed in the configuration that triumphs.

Beijing's white paper takes the position that "the trends towards world multipolarization and economic globalization are deepening amid twists and turns." Yet it sees a "challenge" in "the prolonged existence of unipolarity vis-à-vis multipolarity." For Beijing, the major obstacle to the world that it desires, in which China is the undisputed regional power in East Asia, is Washington's unipolar geostrategy.

In an accurate assessment of the current situation, the white paper notes that "new changes are occurring in the balance of power among the major international players, with the process of their realignment and the redistribution of their interests accelerated." In Beijing's view, those changes work in its favor and China's power will grow as long as its development is not thrown off track by wars in its region or crises elsewhere that provoke economic disruption.

Again accurately, the paper observes that "new and profound readjustments have taken place in the relations among the world's major countries," leading to a confused pattern in which "while cooperating with and seeking support from each other, they are checking on and competing with each other as well." The aim of Beijing's security strategy is to position China most favorably to cooperate and compete successfully, as its perceived interests dictate.

Beijing's Perceived Interests

In the "pluralistic, diversified and interdependent world" that Beijing's decision makers perceive, the regime sees China's overriding interest as internal development, so that the country becomes a complete power within the next 20 years -- "to build a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way." Beijing is unwilling to play a specialized part in any external power's design and seeks autonomy in all spheres of collective existence. The white paper acknowledges that "as a large developing country, China has before it an arduous task of modernization, which calls for persistent hard work."

The regime's understanding that China is not yet a complete power and that it must continue to maintain an inward focus is behind its present stance as a "status-quo power." Economically, China's development is export driven, so it has to retain acceptable relations with its trading partners and has an interest in the stability of other power centers. The white paper announces that "China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony," which, interpreted more realistically, means that Beijing is not ready to start punching "at its weight" until it progresses further in its drive toward development.

In the military dimension, "all-round" development means that Beijing intends to build a state-of-the-art armed force based on embracing "the revolution in military affairs" that is remaking combat by infusing "mechanization" with "informationization." The foundation of Beijing's security policy is a high-tech armed force that is capable of winning "local wars" -- a posture it calls "active defense." Successfully completing the revolution in military affairs is the single most important requisite of Beijing's geostrategy because only then would it be able to displace Washington. Neoconservative strategists in the Pentagon understand this; it is the basis of their judgment that Washington has a shrinking window of opportunity to retain a significant foothold in East and Southeast Asia.

As a result of its overriding interest in internal economic development, Beijing puts military modernization in the service of its goal of creating a "moderately prosperous society." The regime does not intend to sacrifice its domestic economic goals by engaging in militarization or an arms race, but it is also clear that "China is determined to safeguard its national sovereignty and security, no matter how the international situation may evolve." Beijing's posture of "active defense" means that the regime is willing to be patient, peaceful and cooperative as long as events fall in with its general expectations of enhanced power, but will change course if its progress towards its goals is disrupted by other powers, specifically the U.S.

The white paper identifies several issues in the Asia-Pacific region that are potential sources of serious conflict. Noting that "complicated security factors" in the region "are on the increase," the paper cites Washington's realignment and reinforcement of its military presence there by "buttressing military alliances and accelerating deployment of missile defense systems." In addition, "Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile defense system for future deployment."

Both Washington and Tokyo complicate Beijing's geostrategy, presenting the regime with a dilemma. Were Beijing to succeed in edging Washington out of East Asia, Tokyo would be tempted to militarize and perhaps nuclearize, substituting a new formidable adversary for the old familiar one. The presence of Japan in the picture puts a check on Beijing's possible confrontation with Washington, giving the latter some leverage. Japan is China's competitor for markets and resources. Washington's presence places a damper on open hostility between Beijing and Tokyo. How Beijing negotiates the tripartite power relation will in great part determine the success of its geostrategy.

Washington and Tokyo are long-term persistent problems for Beijing; Taiwan is more insistent and appears to be the single factor that might disrupt the regime's "status-quo" posture. The white paper reserves its most blunt and assertive language for the Taiwan issue, stating that "the situation in the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is grim," criticizing Washington for arming Taipei, and throwing down the marker that "any reckless attempt" by Taipei to move towards independence will be "resolutely and thoroughly crushed at any cost."

The Taiwan issue poses difficulties for Washington and Beijing. Washington offers security to Taipei because Taiwan is its most important foothold in East Asia. Were China to unify, Washington's presence in the region would be significantly diminished. Yet Washington needs to maintain its economic relations with Beijing to protect American investments and understands that Beijing has limits with regard to Taiwan, which means that Washington must support the "one China" policy and try to check moves towards independence in Taipei.

Beijing, in turn, is not yet ready to fight for Taiwan militarily and needs to maintain its U.S. export markets. At present, the incipient Beijing-Washington conflict is stalemated, but the situation is inherently unstable. The best indicator of whether Beijing or Washington is winning the geostrategic contest in East Asia is the status of the unification issue, which is China's chosen field of battle.

Military Diplomacy: War Games With Russia

As it works through its geostrategy, Beijing increasingly relies on what it calls "military diplomacy" to advance towards its goals. Taking an "all-sided" approach, China has entered into a wide variety of security dialogues and agreements with states and organizations in Southeast and Central Asia, and participates in joint maneuvers, military visits and exchanges, and reciprocal observations of war games. The most important development of this all-sided policy came on December 27 -- simultaneously with the publication of the white paper -- with the announcement that Beijing and Moscow had agreed to conduct their first joint military exercises during the second half of 2005.

To be held on Chinese territory, the exercises are to be large scale and comprehensive, including army, navy, air force and submarine units, and possibly strategic bombers. The war games are a further step in the "strategic partnership" between Moscow and Beijing, which began after Washington and the European Union imposed arms embargoes on Beijing in the aftermath of the suppression in 1989 of the Chinese pro-democracy movement. Since then, China has become the major purchaser of Russian armaments, including fighter aircraft, missiles, submarines and naval destroyers.

The joint exercises indicate Moscow's and Beijing's common interest in countering Washington's unipolar strategy. For Moscow, which has suffered serious geostrategic reversals in Georgia and Ukraine, which moved towards the West in 2004, the exercises are particularly significant and represent a step in the direction of Moscow's goal of forging a trilateral alliance with Beijing and New Delhi, which is Moscow's second biggest arms customer. Beijing's aims appear to be less ambitious and to be motivated by the desire to curb Washington and to gain greater access to Russian and Central Asian energy supplies.

The growing strategic relationship between Moscow and Beijing represents a shift in the world balance of power that works to Beijing's advantage by pulling Moscow closer to its sphere of influence and away from the West. Having resolved in 2004 the marginal territorial disputes that had kept them from cooperating, Beijing and Moscow are now ready to act in greater concert to achieve the multipolar configuration of power that they both desire. It is just such changes that speed and channel the drift towards multipolarity and begin to give it a more stable form.

If their strategic relationship continues to deepen, Moscow and Beijing will have a greater chance of edging Washington out of Central Asia by solidifying the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The more pressure exerted on Washington from "all sides," the freer Beijing will be to move in East Asia.

Conclusion

Beijing's white paper on national defense and its application of the geostrategy presented there to holding war games with Moscow indicate realism, rationality and political maturity and sophistication. China's "ruling party" is aware of and forthright about the country's present limitations and has formulated a plausible strategy of "active defense" to overcome them over the next two decades.

Active defense means that Beijing will play a waiting game and punch below its weight until the regime feels that it is ready to act more assertively. As it gains strength, Beijing will expand its reach, as it has done in planning joint exercises with Russia. Barring unforeseeable crises that would disturb its progress toward becoming the undisputed regional power center of East and Southeast Asia, Beijing's major problems come from Washington and Tokyo, and from its perceived need to incorporate Taiwan in order to make its East Asian aspirations credible.

It is far from certain that Beijing will be able to finesse Washington and Tokyo, and, in the near term, to absorb Taiwan, but time seems to be on its side.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein